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My first experience with violent conflict started when I first heard of a rebel attack in 
the neighbouring country of Liberia, 1989, where a group of armed men began an 
assault on the regime of the former dictator, Samuel K. Doe. To quote Reinhold 
Niebuhr: ‘All human sin seems so much worse in its consequences than in its 
intentions’, in other words, what started in Liberia as an isolated incident soon turned 
out to be a catastrophic quagmire. It led to the mass execution of people; the wanton 
destruction of infrastructure and the massive wave of refugees fleeing to the 
neighbouring states including Sierra Leone. Ironically, the armed group, which called 
itself the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), stated that their objective was to 
oust the corrupt and oppressive regime of the then leadership. Significantly, the 
leadership of Sierra Leone was no exception to this kind of socio-economic and 
political problems but the APC government did not think that a similar fate lurked in 
its path. Two years later a similar group of armed men, who were termed marauders, 
attacked Sierra Leone in the eastern district of Kailahun, 23rd March 1991.This mist, 
which at first seemed like a man’s fist, blew and turned out to be a tempestuous wind 
that greatly struck Sierra Leone for a decade. This wave of violent conflict became 
one of the darkest spots in the history of West Africa at the time; it began spreading 
like a cancer, and took many political pundits by surprise. Like many people then, and 
may be future generations, I became interested in why and how such madness was 
unleashed on Sierra Leone during 1991-2002. 
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1 General Introduction 
During the decolonization process in Africa, many leaders were much optimistic1 
about their newly won political freedom and their task ahead of nation building.  They 
promised their citizens a prosperous future with the rule of law, equal political 
participation and representation, economic wealth and development. But many of 
these newly independent nation-states faced difficult challenges in their quest for 
socio-economic development; alarmingly, they did not deliver on these promises. As 
some scholars put it, regardless of regime type or ideology, these states confronted 
three general challenges of economic development in this post-colonial era: poverty, 
structural transformation and dependence (Chazan et al, 1999:239). In other words, 
these states were economically poor to provide the revenues needed for economic 
development; they also suffered from the limited structural institutions like 
infrastructure and the few industries left behind by the colonial states, which 
eventually made them dependent on their former colonial state for revenue. Thus, as 
Ayoob argues, they experienced problem of legitimacy, general inability to organize 
their material and human resources, mobilize their citizens and implement policies for 
societal growth (1995:11), nor did some of leaders truly realize that the key 
responsibility of states was to deliver political goods(basic need)2 like security, health, 
education, economic opportunities and good governance (Potter, 2004:2). This was a 
snapshot of Sierra Leone(S/L) following its independence in 1961.  
The inability of a state to provide these basic needs, and exercise monopoly over the 
legitimate use of physical force in its territory could amount to a lack of strength. The 
terms weak, failed, collapsed and strong states became new concepts in some social 
science academia in the early 90s, particularly after the end of the cold war. However, 
this is not to say that the conditions characterizing these concepts are new phenomena. 
The debates in this new school of thought have developed many hypotheses in 
determining weak, failed, collapsed and strong states. In determining these states, the 
ability and capability of its leaders to provide the basic needs of their citizens are very 
important because politics is all about governance and performance in that regard. 
The variable to determine whether X is strong, weak, failed and collapsed has to do 
with the ability, capability, efficiency and willingness of the state institutions to 
                                               
1 These post-colonial leaders referred to the 1st set of African leaders immediately after independence. 
2 Basic needs will be used interchangeably with political goods to mean  provision of the core functions 
of state: law and order, security of life and property , socio-economic services,  the rule of law like 
political rights to vote, protection of citizens rights.et.c  
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deliver the basic needs of its citizens. In S/L from 1961 to 1990, the situation was that 
the state was incapacitated to effectively provide its citizens with their basic needs. In 
1991, violent conflict broke out and this work will examine if this was a result of the 
state weakness or incapacity. 
1.1   An overview of the violent conflict in Sierra Leone 
Any analysis of the state weakness in Sierra Leone (S/L) must involve a brief 
historical past. The country witnessed political upheaval after its independence in 
1961 with the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) as the dominant political institution 
to produce the country’s first two heads of state, Sir Milton Margai and his brother Sir 
Albert Margai (Ero, 2003:234). The SLPP later lost power in the general election of 
1967 to the All People’s Congress (APC) because it alienated the other ethnic groups. 
But the transition process took a nosedive as the sordid political shenanigans of power 
struggle arose among the country’s leading ethnic groups. It was an early sign of the 
post-colonial state weakness as the SLPP politicians instigated the military to 
overthrow the APC (Ero, 2003: 234).  The military chief of staff said he stepped in on 
the grounds of irregularities and the imminence of ethnic conflict. He arrested and 
later sent the opposition leader to exile. Significantly, his action had a smoking gun; 
he was an in-law to the Prime Minister and being a Mende from the southeastern part 
of the country, it was seen as a mask to keep the SLPP in power. He was immediately 
overthrown by a group of junior personnel from the northern and western area, who 
were opposed to the southern dominated SLPP. When the APC leader, Siaka Stevens 
was reinstated in 1968, most of the key institutions responsible for good governance: 
the economy, the parliament, the judiciary were paralyzed (Ero, 2003:234). In the 
process, President Stevens governed the state on the basis of patrimony, exploited and 
manipulated the access to the country’s resources (Reno, 1995; Ero, 2003). This 
resulted in bad governance, especially the inadequate provisions of basic needs, which 
is the key indicator of a weak state. The inadequate basic needs included massive 
unemployment, poor educational, health and infrastructural facilities. Consequently, it 
created massive economic inequalities, which led to an insatiable demand and 
struggle for a share of the state resources that sowed the seeds for violent conflict 
when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked S/L in 1991 from Liberia 
(Keen, 1998; Reno, 1995) and lasted until 2002. 
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1.2 Objective 
• To investigate how the inability of a weak state to provide the basic needs of 
its people could lead to violent conflict. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
• A weak state is ineffective in providing the basic needs of its citizens and this 
ineffectiveness could have the potential for violent conflict. 
1.4 Research Questions 
• How and why could the weak state political and socio-economic structures 
have contributed to and escalated the violent conflict from 1991 to 2000? 
• What role can international actors play in escalating or solving internal violent 
conflicts? 
1.5 Significance of the research to peace studies 
In modern states, the duty of governments is to provide the basic needs of their 
citizens. From the French Revolution of 1789 to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
among a catalogue of violent conflict we see the phenomena of weak states and 
violent conflicts. These events could highlight the assumption that when a state is 
unable to address the welfare of its citizen’s, there is the likelihood for an outbreak of 
mass political violence. The internal consequences of the French and Iranian 
revolution were their severity and effect on other neighbouring states. For instance, 
the French revolution of 1789 led to European wars and the Napoleonic wars between 
France, Britain, Russia, and Austria. The Iranian revolution of 1979 saw the rise of an 
Islamic fundamentalist regime that threatened the security of the Middle East as well 
as western security and. This historical silhouette, as it were, is to show the likely 
threat weak states could pose to both national and international security.  
The significance of this work is to examine the dynamic relationship between weak 
state and violent conflict in the case of S/L, and not across the broader spectrum of 
violent conflict. It is important to note that the outbreak of the violent conflict in 
Liberia, which was a weak state, had the destabilizing effect of a decade long civil 
war in S/L from 1991 to 2002. 
Methodology: This study employed the qualitative method of case study. It was 
adopted because it is a useful mechanism to get an in-depth examination of a research 
problem, which included the use of questionnaires and interviews. This was to involve 
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a segment of the general population, since a research does not necessarily need to 
have a hundred percent representation in order to explain a body of knowledge. 
Outline : This work is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is a the general 
introduction; Chaper 2 is the Theoretical discussion; Chapter 3 is about 




2 Theoretical Perspectives on the State and Post-Colonial State  
Scientific evidence is always couched in theory; in other words, an evidence or data is 
produced with a theory.  A theory tries to explain a body of knowledge in a particular 
discipline. It is something provisional, tentative and in need of testing (Gilbert, 
2003:2). There are some theories that have been observed, put to accurate 
experimental tests to verify their validity and thus, have become facts to explain the 
phenomena in certain discourses. For example, Einstein’s theory of relativity proved 
that gravity or massive objects could warp space. Hence, a strong theory must ‘be able 
to make predictions that are consistent with observable facts already acquired or to be 
acquired by doing further experiments’ (Lurquin & Stone, 2007:7). 
 
However, there is a difference when it comes to social science about the theories of 
some social phenomena. There is hardly any real hard evidence to observe and 
experiment, which can be validated with the rigors of pure scientific procedures; 
though, we can still explain the daily phenomenon of people and their societies. Thus, 
in political science, one such phenomenon is the theory of state, which is about state 
formation and nation building. The theory of state has to with governance: the 
structures of power and economic allocation of resources, stability, progress and 
development.  Political institutions have always existed because where there is man, 
there is a society; where there is a society, there are economic and political structures. 
But how did the notion of political institutions, which we know as states start?  
 
The idea and reality of statehood is ‘markedly a time-and condition-bound concept’ 
(Dusza1989:78) and has been one of the cornerstones of western civilization. It 
spanned both the ancient philosophy of Socrates, Plato, to modern thinkers such as 
Machiavelli, Locke, Hobbes, Marx and Weber3 (Nelson, 1982). The contributions of 
these pioneers see the notion of the state as the most intricate structure of human 
societies, which therefore gives it superior qualities than the other social organizations 
like the family or people that preceded it. According to Rousseau, it is the state that 
provides the greatest opportunity for the highest satisfaction and expression of human 
interactions and implanting of virtues. Weber sees the state as a joint human action, 
                                               
3 Socrates and Plato idealized the state (i.e. philosopher kings) meaning the ruler should be seen as a 
philosopher; Hobbes, Machiavelli and Weber talk about absolute power (the Leviathan); Rousseau and 
Locke speak about the idea of social contract (restricting the state).   
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where power and struggle are the intrinsic elements of social life; the very substance 
of which politics is made (Weber, 1968:55).  
The ascendancy of the state and its influence has not been without debate because the 
very notion of state has often been contested of what it is and should be. Some 
thinkers like Hobbes argued that it should be absolute, while Locke argued it should 
be restricted, which he called a social contract. Marxists see the state as class in the 
political superstructure as an organized instrument of oppression by the ruling elite 
through the economic substructure. In other words, the capitalist structures are there 
to serve the interests of the owners of production, capitalist class (Nelson, 1982).  
Some neo-Marxists look at the inequalities that exist among states, i.e. the developed 
and less developed countries. Power is institutionalized in the framework of which it 
is contested. But there is more to politics than the struggle for power; mostly, the 
economic resources are allocated to the society through the institutional structures of 
power (Dusza, 1989:73). 
In this chapter, the theoretical perspectives on the post-colonial state will begin with 
the various postulations of state; we will conceptualize state variations and the 
problems with these variations. The theories of conflict and violence will be discussed 
and the African state will be contextualized within the political economy framework. 
Thus, this political economy approach will be used to examine the violent conflict in 
S/L.  
2.1  Modes of State Conceptualization  
As discussed earlier, there are many notions about the intricate phenomenon of the 
state. The following notions are one among many modes of conceptualizing the state 
(Hintze in Dusza, 1989:74): (a) the sovereign power-state in the framework of the 
European state system (b) the relatively closed economic state based on the capitalist 
mode of production (c) the liberal legal-constitutional state with its emphasis on 
individual rights and liberties (d) the democratic nation-state. We will try to subsume 
these modes under two concepts: traditional (i.e. list a&b) and modern (i.e. list c&d). 
2.1.1 Traditional State Concept 
In common parlance, the word state is understood as a territory with political 
institutions. However, the first problem arises with the various academic dispute of 
what the term should refer to. Most of the conceptualization comes from the 
perspectives of political science and sociology (Buzan 1991:59). The ascendancy and 
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centrality of the modern state means that its definition is always a subject of 
controversy (Francis, 2006: 34). From the sociology perspective, Weber defines a 
state as: ‘a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous 
organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, 
including all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction’ (Weber, ed. Parson, 
1964:156). The juridical aspect defines the state as a legal person, recognize by 
international law with the following attributes: (a) a defined territory, (b) a permanent 
population, (c) an effective government, and (d) independence, or the right “to enter 
into relations with other states” (Brownlie, 1979:73-76). 
 
Although Hobbes conceptualizes the state as a ‘leviathan’, it does not mean that 
people are not protected against its power. Such controls include separation of power, 
which regulates the legal norms and functions of specific state institutions, aiming not 
only at efficiency but limiting their authority. Besides the separation of power, there 
are other modern conceptualizations of protection against the state’s domination. 
 
2.1.2 Modern State Concepts 
These concepts will be subsumed under the following: pluralism, instrumentalism and 
structuralism. 
Pluralism: It is based on certain assumptions, recognizing that in a state there are 
many groups and interests striving to influence the government’s decision in their 
favour. Pluralists believe that in a liberal democracy, where there is an open and fair 
process of decision making, no particular groups or individuals will benefit more than 
the other. It is assumed also that all these social units have, more or less, equal chance 
to influence their government through the electoral process or lobbying activity. 
One such example is the civil society, which is defined as ‘that set of diverse non-
governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, 
while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and 
arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and 
atomizing the rest of society’ (Gellner, 1994:5). 
Instrumentalism: This is a neo-Marxist analysis of the state, which argues the 
owners of production are able to control and direct the state because those who 
control it are either directly from the economic elite or share their values or ideologies 
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(Milliband, 1969:49-56; Weatherly, 2005). The state thus, becomes an instrument of 
this class to direct state policies. 
Structuralism: It is also a neo-Marxist view of the state critical of the instrumentalist 
approach (Poulantzas, 1969). It assumes that the state’s key role is to prevent conflicts 
and contradictions from breaking the institutions, that is to put simply, where 
governance should be guided by the values of the structures and not the interests of 
those in control or any particular group.Others have argued that the legitimacy of 
modern states must be based on the idea of political rights of autonomous individual 
subjects (Habermas, 1996).  
As the notion of statehood continues to change and contested, so are the variations of 
statehood. 
2.2 State Categorizations 
The categorization of states about their socio-economic and political development 
became the new genre of social science in the 90s, where states are put into different 
categories of strong, weak, failed and collapsed on the basis of certain variables. But 
such categorizations as a ‘failed or collapsed state is characterized by what it is not’ 
(Clapham, 2000), because ‘the concepts of state failure and state collapse have been 
victims of conceptual ambiguity of our times as these terms are interchangeably used’ 
(Akude, 2007:2). We now attempt a brief discussion of these various categorizations. 
2.2.1 Strong States 
Rotberg’s point of departure in state variation is that contemporary states exist to 
provide what he calls ‘political goods’4 to their citizens (Rotberg, 2004:10). It is 
according to their performance, i.e. the effective delivery of the most basic needs that 
strong states are differed from weak, fragile and failed states. His hierarchy of 
political goods (basic needs) include: state and human security, free and fair political 
participation, proper health care, education and infrastructural facilities. In short, this 
is a shopping list of what is meant by good governance. In terms of their performance 
level, strong states function well across a wide variety, although with slight variations. 
A strong state is like the Mount Everest in state relations; it is the quintessential 
hallmark of achievement. Examples of strong states include the G8 among others 
(France, US, UK, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada and Russia). However, the litmus 
                                               
4 Though Rotberg calls it thus, for consistency sake the term will be used interchangeably with basic 
needs. 
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test is whether every unit of its body politic is willing, fully engaged and benefiting 
from its success or development. The antithesis of a strong state is a weak state. 
 
2.2.2 Weak States 
Weak states, as the name suggests exist as the opposite of strong states. They are 
unable to effectively deliver the most basic needs Rotberg calls ‘political goods’: state 
and human security, adequate socio-economic services as health, education and 
infrastructural facilities. They are characterized by lack of good governance and 
problems of legitimacy (Jackson, 2002:38). In such states, basically, legitimacy is 
expressed by the level of political participation, use of force to ensure obedience, 
political instability (coups, riots, and revolts), ethnic tensions and the centralization of 
power in the leader, a party or regime, e.g. Burma, Syria, Zimbabwe and Iraq under 
President Saddam Hussein. As in most states, where political power has always been 
contested, in weak states, the ruling elite practice an effective patronage system to 
broker power by co-opting political rivals to compensate or ostracized them. But 
patronage system does not always follow institutional incapacity because some of 
these institutions could be very effective in performing their respective functions; e.g. 
the Burmese military had been very effective in maintaining the authoritarian rule 
against the democratic movement of Aung San Suu Kyi and others.  
For others, weak states refer to strength and not scope, meaning a lack of institutional 
capacity and competence to implement effective policies (Fukuyama, 2004:130; 
Byman& Evera, 1998:37). Since some weak states cannot effectively protect their 
borders, they are vulnerable to external threats like states and individuals; some even 
face problems of arms smuggling and criminal activities across their borders. For 
example, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire were all weak states that later cascaded into 
violent conflict and became failed states where mercenaries and predatory activities 
run amok with weapon smuggling and looting of resources. 
2.2.3 Failed States 
Helmen and Ratner, 1993, first initiated the term state failure, later taken up by 
Tetzlaff, 1999 and Rotberg, 2004. State failure is seen as a long term and multifaceted 
development where state collapsed is the accretion and worst form of the process 
(Tetzlaff, 1999:34-37). Tetzlaff classified two aspects to state failure: the loss of 
legitimacy, which is the slow decline of public support and lack of obedience for the 
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government where it cannot provide the basic needs of its citizens, and the rising 
dysfunction of state institutions; either due to lack of resources or fiscal 
mismanagement. A state is said to be failing if no attempt is made to stop the 
deterioration in institutional governance and provision of political goods (Rotberg, 
2004:5). It is typified by declining and shattered infrastructures, thriving corruption, 
and low gross domestic product, indebtedness to international financial institutions, 
devalued local currency, low legitimacy (Rotberg, 2004:5). For example, Nigeria is 
one of the leading oil producing OPEC countries, yet was heavily indebted that the 
Paris Club had to cancel $ 18 billion of its staggering $30 billion debt owed to 
creditors, but it had to comply with certain conditions of good governance and crack 
down on corruption. A failed state is also characterized by violence; however, as 
Rotberg says, ‘it is not the absolute intensity that identifies a failed state. Rather, it is 
the enduring character of that violence’, which results in further weakening of the 
state. Thus, ‘a failed state is a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the 
fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world’ (Rotberg, 2004:7).  
2.2.4 Collapsed States 
Zartman was first to introduce the term state collapse (Zartman, 1995). For Rotberg, 
state collapse is the progression of decrepit governance that starts with institutional 
dysfunction (state weakness), failing and failure until it struck rock bottom.  The 
process is not a mechanical one since it could be averted through good governance 
(Rotberg, 2004).  State collapse is also perceived within the scaffold of a state’s 
inability to perform its traditional functions. The state should be responsible for its 
sovereign authority, decision-making and securing its territory and subjects (Zartman, 
1995:5); thus, where this is lacking it signifies the start of collapse.  He did not 
attempt to make a prediction of the process that Rotberg’s similar outline suggests, he 
sees state collapse as ‘a situation whereby the structure, authority, laws and political 
order have fallen apart and must be reconstructed in some form, new or old’ 
(Zartman, 1995:7). Rotberg sees state collapse as ‘a rare and extreme version of a 
failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. A collapse 
state exhibits a vacuum of authority; it is ‘a mere geographical expression, a black 
hole into which a failed polity is fallen’ (Rotberg, 2004:10). But it is utopian to have a 
complete vacuum in any state. 
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Having looked at these state variations, let us now see the intrinsic problems of 
conceptualizing them. 
 
2.3 Problem of Conceptualizing State Variations  
In this section, I endeavour to delineate the disorder in state variations, including a 
brief introduction about the difficulties of conceptualizing basic needs, which we 
discuss later. The question is what constitutes a weak state: is it corruption, low 
legitimacy and lack of political participation (democracy) or nepotism? Are strong 
states the opposite of weak states, and what constitutes a strong state? Are democratic 
states capable of achieving what they pledge in their campaign manifesto to the 
electorate? If no, what are the effects? Does a strong state represent good governance 
and promote minority rights? Analyzing the relationship between state and citizens 
raises the question of what kinds of rights citizens have in their political process and 
how the resources are allocated. For some, the political process is about the autonomy 
of their cities, communes, provinces to govern rather than being governed from the 
center. On cannot answer all these questions here; but, we can attempt to list some of 
the key variables in these state variations. 





Ineffective rule of law
Inability to implement a given 
policy
Ineffective or no civil society
Effective delivery of basic needs
Good governance
Effective legitimacy                                     
Less corruption
Trust
Strong rule of law
Effective to implement a given 
policy
Effective civil society
WEAK STATE                                 STRONG STATE                                        
Strong states have a democratically elected government by the will of the majority 
people as well as protection of minority rights. Some Weak states do have elections but 
the question remains if it could be democratic; others do not have elections either or 
protect minority rights.
 
And as we will discuss later basic needs is related to space and time. Given this, we 
will start with a brief discussion of basic needs; but we shall deal with this further in 
the next section. Basic needs imply some claims about what humans naturally should 
have or interpreted as how people are able to manage and secure their livelihoods.  It 
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is what we could agree on as being basic or it could also be essentialist, meaning as 
humans for instance, we need food to survive. In some states, especially the west, the 
case could be made for democracy as a basic need where the people are able to elect 
their own leaders in a free and fair elections. Locke tries to unite basic needs into two 
concepts: protection of life and property. He presupposes a social contract where the 
government is accountable to the people in securing their livelihoods in all its forms, 
including the protection of their citizens or human rights5. Citizens’ rights are spatial, 
while human rights attempts to be universal. Let me clarify this; the right to vote is 
spatial and not universal because citizens can only vote in their own countries and not 
in other countries. There is an idea where basic needs could be understood in 
protection of citizens and human rights.   
No doubt, there seems to be many conceptions about basic needs and state 
responsibilities; however, some things stand out as the standard functions of state: 
monopoly over the use of force and protection of its citizens from attacks, legitimate 
institutions for governance and absolute control of their territory, which are expected 
of states under international law. Given this premise, we will nuance some of the 
problems of state variations with some contemporary international relations issues. 
The variations of states into weak, failed, collapsed and strong states are frustratingly 
imprecise (Eizenstat, Porter, Weinstein, 2005:136) because states can perform 
differently, either better or poor on various variables. It is imprecise because the 
variables tend to overlap or blur the variations. For example, let us compare Norway, 
Sweden and the USA. Without doubt, the USA is the world’s most strong and richest 
economy; even the states of New York and California have an economy richer than 
the combined GNP of Norway and Sweden. Geographically, Norway and Sweden are 
smaller than the USA, yet economically both have the highest Human Development 
Index in the world6. Both are able to protect their borders effectively, equally 
distribute their wealth and provide their citizens with their basic needs. They have 
enjoyed the top spot in the UN Human Development Index (UNDP 2007/2008). The 
USA has the strongest military in the world and yet it has not effectively provided its 
citizens with their basic needs. She has a population of about 300 million, of which, 
there are close to 30 million uneducated and about 38 million people live below the 
                                               
5 The distinction is important because there are those who see human rights as a western value 
imposition, while citizens’ rights could be the spatial or local conceptualisations of rights. 
6 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets- 2007/ 2008 UN Development Programme. But 
the high HDI of Scandinavia even goes as far back 1990 to date. 
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poverty line7. Despite its abundance of food resources, there are over countless 
pounds of wasted food every year in the USA. Based on the state variations indicators 
the USA is considered stronger to Sweden and Norway; however, according to 
providing the basic human needs and equal resource allocation, both are stronger than 
the USA; thereby explaining the paucity of sharply argued, instructive, and well-
delineated cases (Rotberg, 2002:2). In the US, there are stronger mechanisms of legal 
recourse for the protection of citizen’s right against the federal government partly 
because of the constitutional provisions like separation of powers and the judiciary’s 
independence. Citizens in Norway and Sweden like the rest of EU countries can take 
their governments to the European Court of Human Rights if their rights are violated. 
 
Again, the question is how one argues about the recent presidential elections in the 
former Soviet republics, including Russia. For instance, in March 2008, the President 
of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, now called the last dictator in Europe, had a 
fraudulent election and then authorized his security to arrest and beat hundreds of 
peaceful protesters. President Putin of Russia was among the few world leaders to 
congratulate his electoral victory. It was not a surprise since Putin himself had deftly 
removed any checks and balances within the state, weakened political and legal 
transparency, and made it impossible for independent media, political parties or 
nongovernmental groups to prosper. Even the Bush administration and EU has 
acknowledged that the recent development lamentably point toward a declining 
commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions in Russia. The argument here is 
that Russia is considered a strong state but such politics shows the vagueness of 
categorizing states, where the basic rights of the Russian electorate is held at ransom. 
Interestingly, Russia has enjoyed an unfettered diplomatic pass or embrace unlike 
some other states, which have faced the pressure to democratize or have been made 
pariah states, e.g. Cuba and South Africa during its Apartheid era. 
 
The problem with these categorizations is about not being able to clearly define than 
explain what is actually meant.  There are weak states that are not failed or collapsed 
since they have not had violent conflict. According to the spatial correlation of war, 
this presupposes that if a country is at war, there is a tendency for the neighbouring 
                                               
7 http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/002484.html published 
by the US Census Bureau News, 2003 
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state to experience it (Most& Star). This was borne out in the case of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone(S/L), where the civil war that broke out in Liberia, 1989, easily spread 
to S/L in 1991. Later some insurgents started to invade Guinea from S/L; though 
Guinea is a weak state, yet it was able to survive because it has strong institutional 
capacity like the military unlike S/L and Liberia. Yet there are neighbouring states 
with violent conflicts, which have not been affected with what happens in the other 
state; e.g. the protracted battle between the Ugandan government and the Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) has not affected neighbouring states like Kenya or Tanzania. 
In addition, let us look at Rotberg’s words of states being ‘able’ and ‘willing’. The 
inability to deliver basic economic goods does not limit the ability and capacity of a 
state to use force, e.g. North Korea is a nuclear power but is economically weak, 
because its economy is in decline; there is little investment and revenue generating 
capacity. Ironically, it cannot adequately feed its population and instead uses it 
nuclear weapon program as a negotiating tool (carrot) to influence the west, especially 
the USA to provide it with food and economic aid to help sustain it. India and 
Pakistan is another case. Both are strong enough as nuclear states, able to provide 
billion of dollars to run such nuclear programs, yet there is massive poverty and 
disparity in their countries. The point is that some states are able to provide security in 
their borders, strong in suppressing their citizens and show lack of good governance, 
which could be argued are weak states.  
 
Other states could be willing to deliver their core functions but some face 
circumstances beyond their control, which prevent them from doing it. It is no secret 
that the EU, USA and Japan have continued to increase agricultural subsidies for their 
farmers so as to undercut competition of cheaper prices of the developing countries. 
The unfavourable conditions of aid and free trade by the international financial 
institutions have left many developing states no options but to accept these conditions 
of trade liberalization (Mkandawire, 1990; Magbaily Fyle, 1993). For instance, the 
African state has been asked to liberalize its foreign trade while the developed 
countries still have strong protection of their industries, especially agriculture. The 
developed countries protection against the developing countries agricultural exports is 
seven times higher than that of the developed than the developing countries8.  
                                               
8 Global Economic Prospects, 2004:xvi-vii 
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The distinction of scope and strength provides a framework to look at the different 
aspects of governance to determine whether a state is strong or weak. Fukuyama 
(2004:6-23) categorizes three aspects of statehood: enforcement, the monopoly on and 
lawful use of physical force; scope, the functions carried out by government; and 
strength or capacity, the ability of a government to determine and execute its policies. 
Using the World Bank’s (1997) paradigm, he divides the catalog of potential state 
doings into minimal, intermediate and activist functions. For instance minimal 
functions are restricted to providing basic public goods such as defence, law and 
order, public health, property rights and protection of the poor, beside anti-poverty 
programmes. Intermediate functions would enlarge this catalog to comprise providing 
education, environmental protection, social insurance and the regulation of services 
and commerce. Lastly, activist functions would cover the organization of private 
activity and asset redistribution. It is relevant that the World Bank recognizes the 
protection of the poor through anti-poverty programmes as a role of even a minimalist 
state. The post-colonial African state is not only minimalist in terms of scope, but also 
weak with reference to enforcement and capacity, which as we will discuss later is 
attributed to several factors, both historic and modern.  
 
Though the distinction between scope and strength of states is about governance, 
somehow the semantics between them is rather controversial. For Fukuyama, the 
state’s strength should not be against economic growth. At best it should be ‘relatively 
modest in scope, but strong in ability to carry out its state functions such as the 
maintenance of law and the protection of property’ 9(2004:15); in other words, it 
emphasises power over good governance.  
Also, the concept of states scope and strength is about power or real politic. Some 
states want to see other states’ scope and strength reduced or increased, which could 
have tremendous effects. For instance, the US supported the Mujahedeen against the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. After the Soviet’s withdrawal in 1989, 
Pakistan supported the breakaway Mujahedeen faction, which calls itself the Taliban 
against other factions; the effect was seen years later with the 9/11 terrorists attacks. 
                                               
9 To some extent this latter reflects Locke’s concept of social contract; the state protects the life and 
property of the citizens but it is not something it naturally enjoys and exercises at the expense of its 
people. 
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But for others, ‘the 9/11 attacks underlined the fact that the lack of governance in poor 
and troubled parts of the world like Afghanistan could have profound security 
consequences for the developed world’ (Fukuyama, 2004:125). This is but an 
embodiment of those who perceive weak state in terms of biased security concerns for 
the developed world and not the underdeveloped societies caught up in the untold 
morass of poor governance or violent conflict. It is ironic that very powerful states 
and empires caused the great wars of the 20th and 21st century, and the weak states in 
the developing world are now causing the many problems of poverty, refugees, and 
human rights violations.  
What is missing in this state variations debate is the historical process. The empirical 
element of time could help us understand how state institutions developed from their 
incapacities to being effective or progressing. The bottom line of these state variations 
is the encompassing term of good governance, which, however, took many tortuous 
paths, especially in the developed world, for it to be fully realized. This should not be 
an extenuation for the present predicament of governance in many developing states 
but is worth considering.  
The main preoccupation with the above variations is about conflict and violence, 
peace and development in state-society relations. Next, it is important to make a 
distinction between conflict and violence. 
 
2.4 Conceptualizing Conflict and Violence  
In every human society, there is the daily goal seeking activities among individuals 
and states over values and interests. In peace studies, such daily goal seeking 
activities, Galtung considers incompatible and refers to as contradiction or conflict 
(1996:70-71). 
However, if so, conflict should not be seen as these daily goal seeking activities 
among individuals and states, which are incompatible. Goal seeking activities do not 
necessarily have to be incompatible because people may want the same goals in life 
like a good education, health care and employment, without conflict to others. There 
are also daily compatible goal seeking activities among individuals and states that are 
cooperative. We have many examples of such cooperation among individuals and 
states like we see in the international non-governmental organizations as the UN, the 
EU and NGOs like human rights and environmental groups as Green Peace, e.t.c. In a 
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way, cooperation is imperative in almost all human institutions and societies as a way 
to realize our self-interests, which do not necessarily mean selfish. 
 
Galtung refers to conflict as dispute and dilemma; a thing standing in the way of 
something else (1996:70). Dispute is related to a situation when individuals or states 
pursue the same scarce goals or needs and are not willing to cooperate. The same 
could be said of dilemma when individuals or states are faced with two incompatible 
goals involving choice and decision (Galtung, 1996:71-72). Such conflicts do not 
inevitably lead to actual violence but since our goals as individuals and states are 
incompatible, we inevitably face challenges in achieving these goals. These 
challenges could be real or apparent perceived as a threat or obstacle imposed by a 
known actor. The worse form of this conflict could be direct violence, in which the 
aims of opponents struggling over the values, claims to scarce resources, status and 
power is to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1956:8). We saw this 
clearly when the USA and UK invaded Iraq in 2003 over the arguable claims of 
WMD (weapons of mass destruction), which inevitably led to the killing of thousands 
of Iraqi including President Saddam Hussein and his two sons. 
 
The violence concept involves a lot of issues that in many ways affect people. SIDA 
defines violent conflict as “incompatibilities or differences between groups of people 
that result in organized violence” 10(2005:4). For Galtung, there are three kinds of 
violence: direct, structural and cultural (1996:196).  
Direct violence involves the outright use of force on people in every society. 
Structural violence on the other hand is equated with indirect violence, which refers to 
the violence that emanates from the social structure itself between class, race, and sex. 
Galtung is clear about structural violence, which may not be deliberate; that people 
may do massive damage to others without intending it; they just do their routine 
defined by the structures or society institutions (1985:145). But what Galtung is 
saying about structural violence may not fit the conventional view of violence. It is 
inequality because violence involves real physical pain or hurt to people. Cultural 
violence involves the symbolic use of imposing one set of particular cultural values 
on another group with a different cultural values or identity. An example is the radical 
                                               
10 Swedish Development Agency 
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Islamic terrorist group of Al Qaeda, which has been waging both cultural and direct 
violence on innocent civilians in the name of jihad. Cultural violence functions to 
legitimize direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1996:196). 
 
In a similar vein, conflicts can occur at interstate level over ideology and policies like 
trade, human rights or issues of national security. This is the most common political 
spar within international relations; it tends to get hot when the stakes are high but not 
necessarily lead to outright violence like war. An example was the recent violent 
protest in the streets of Athens, London, Paris and San Francisco in March 2008 
against China’s Olympic Torch Relay over its human rights violations in Tibet. Of 
course, we saw the diplomatic punches that were thrown in this fiasco, where the 
British Prime Minster, Gordon Brown and the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
decided to boycott the Beijing Olympic Opening Ceremony in the summer of 2008.  
But the US President, George Bush, refused to weigh in on China and said sport is not 
associated with politics. Also, the quagmire over Iran’s use of nuclear energy, some 
wary states like the US and its allies consider it a threat to international security; since 
Iran is a supporter of terrorist organizations and its President had declared the 
annihilation of Israel. In the present ideological struggle, there is no cooling of the 
steam between radicalism and conservatism of certain religious faiths. For example, 
the diatribe and even overt violence between the Middle East Islamic fundamentalist 
and their far right Christian counterparts in the USA, the neoconservatives, got worse 
after 9/11. In addition, the ideological divide between the Sunni and Shiite is one of 
great debate in countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq that has resulted in 
violent conflict and near absolute anarchy in Iraq.  In Lebanon, May 2008, clashes 
between the Sunni supporting the government and Shiite supporting Hezbollah (a 
controversial nationalist or terrorist organization) have turned the country into a war 
zone.  
We have seen how conflict and violence seems to overlap and differ. There are many 
explanations why violent conflicts occur in state-society relations. We will now 
briefly discuss a few of these. 
2.4.1 Theories of Conflict 
After the end of the cold war, the number of violent conflicts defined as armed 
conflict between groups within a state of which there are at least 200 casualties 
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increased, especially in Africa (Reagan, 2000; Adedeji, 1999; Elbadawi& Sambanis, 
2002). Of about 108 worldwide conflicts between 1989 and 1998, only seven were 
interstate and the rest were internal (Wallenstein & Sollernberg, 1999). Africa was 
divided into 3 categories (Adedeji, 1999): countries with severe internal armed 
conflicts, those with protracted political crises, and those with a relative stable 
political system.  
 The 1990s saw an unprecedented level of violence, economic decline and turbulence 
(Sambanis, 2002; Adedeji, 1999) as most states grappled with the challenges of peace, 
security and prosperity. The following literatures have tried to explain why violent 
conflicts break out in Africa. Some of these tend to focus on the legacies of 
colonialism (Rodney, 1977), neo-colonialism (Parenti, 1989), economic decline and 
effects of international financial institutions (Adedeji, 1995; Mkandawire, 1994), 
natural resources (Collier, 2000; de Soysa, 2000), bad governance and corruption 
(Reno, 1995; Herbst, 2000; La Billion, 2001).  
But the idea that people are prone to war because something is wrong with them (see 
Kaplan, 1994) is a denied reality, because many places like Latin America, including 
Europe in the early 18th century has experienced violent conflicts in the 1830s and 
1840s, which some historians referred to as the ‘era of revolutions’. People do not 
fight due to some intrinsic pathology but because they do not want to be beggars; they 
want a sense of their own independence and livelihood. When this is absent, there is 
no theory that can predict whether people will react or not. 
The following paradigms nevertheless explain some of the reasons behind these 
violent conflicts in the post-colonial African state. 
 
• The grievance theories: This theory identifies the factors of frustration, 
opportunity and identity as the core variables in violent conflict (Ellingsen, 
2000).  The following conflict types are subsumed under the grievance 
paradigm. 
• Horizontal and Vertical inequality is the organized disparity among 
culturally defined ethnic groups that favours one or some above the rest 
(Stewart 2002:3); it is what Galtung refers to as ‘cultural violence’ (Galtung, 
1996). These violent conflicts are often the product of groups’ perceptions of 
‘horizontal inequality’, which could lead to organize violence for political 
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purposes, particularly securing or retaining state power (Stewart, 2002:105-
136). Vertical inequality refers to the normal kind of inequalities that exist 
among individuals. However, it is important that horizontal inequalities do not 
automatically lead to political violence in multi-ethnic states but could be 
susceptible to violent outbursts along these ethnic lines. 
• Protracted Social Conflict is about group identity, which may be constructed 
in the form of religion, class, region or ethnicity (Azar, 1990). In S/L, the 
construction of class and regional identity was salient in the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) membership. It had a good number of the unemployed, 
school dropouts and the marginalized educated few (Richards, 1996). It was 
not surprising that most of the RUF’s membership came from the provinces, 
especially the southeastern part of the country, where the All People’s 
Congress (APC) government was hardly popular. 
• Greed theory: In the greed theory, the very question of grievance is 
unimportant .It argues what matters most are whether the warring faction can 
sustain itself financially. The theory denies grievance is the main cause of 
violent conflict and puts economic profit in its place (Collier, 1998; 2001). 
The presence of ‘lootable natural resources’ is a likely cause for violent 
conflicts and the lure of profit and wealth ‘is likely to recruit young men into 
rebellion’ (Smilie, Gberie, &Hazelton 2000). However, the problem with this 
theory is that it cannot clearly define what is meant by greed. One study finds 
no evidence that suggests natural resources, especially the presence of 
diamonds, is generally related to civil war, because the empirical literature 
gave less attention to the question whether the rebels are actually able to 
exploit this resource (Lujala, Gleditsch& Gilmore, 2005). For example, using 
the violent conflict in Sierra Leone; at the start, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) did not have access to the diamond resources. It was only later 
they were able to exploit it. The intensity and duration of the war turned out to 
be a profit for many actors, including neighbouring states and security firms 
hired by the warring factions but its origin lies elsewhere, which we shall 
discuss more fully in Chapter 4. 
• Relative Deprivation: In addition, greed and grievance theories could be 
synthesized with relative deprivation theory, which is another explanation of 
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political violence. The basis of the theory is that when people in a society 
become dissatisfied with their socio-economic and political condition, they 
desire change. In other words, the deprivation develops from the discrepancy 
between the norm and the reality of collective value satisfaction that disposes 
men to violence (Gurr, 1970: 23). The problem with this concept is that there 
is a discrepancy in what people may feel as deprived when in fact they are not. 
For social discontent to translate into social movement, like the RUF in S/L 
where there was perceived injustice, people must feel they deserve, or are 
rightly entitled to more wealth, power or status than they already have. The 
RUF dissatisfied group came to the conclusion that they could not obtain their 
goal by the usual democratic means.  
According to the relative deprivation theory, the group will translate itself into a 
social movement only if it feels that the collective action of violence would help its 
cause (Gurr, 1970:23). Although this seems to be the RUF situation as they waged a 
violent conflict in S/L, yet it remains unclear whether the RUF thought it would 
succeed to use violence to achieve its objectives. The criticism of relative deprivation 
is that the feelings of deprivation do not necessarily lead people into violence, nor do 
people need to feel deprived before acting. It does not address why perceptions of 
personal or communal deprivation move some people to change society, and why 
other perceptions do not.  
To synthesise the above, the grievance theory helps us understand why some conflicts 
start, and the greed theory explains why some escalate. Thus, a bit of both try to 
explain the nature of violent conflict but it could be wrong to say that people fight 
because they are greedy or motivated by it. In any case, we are all motivated to 
achieve something we want in life, which do not have to be seen as greed. We now 
discuss the forms of conflict that these theories try to explain. 
2.4.2 Forms of Conflict 
There are many forms of violent conflict but this study will restrict itself to the four 
kinds discussed below11. 
Internal conflict occurs within a country such as civil war over the control of natural 
resources; e.g. Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
                                               
11 http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/2698/Poverty-Violent-Conflict-CATEGORIES-VIOLENT-
CONFLICT.html . The contents from this website are from highly –quality, licensed material from 
published forms. 
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potential for such collective violence could depend on the extent and intensity of 
shared discontents among members of a society; it functions as the degree to how 
such discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents. 
 
Internationalized internal conflict occurs when foreign powers intervene in the bloody 
dispute within a country between warring parties. E.g. NATO in the Bosnia and 
Kosovo Wars of the 1990s, Nigeria in S/L from 1998 to 2001. 
 
Interstate violent conflict occurs in the form of war between or among states; e.g. the 
1st and 2nd world wars; the Balkan wars 1992 -1997; Ethiopia-Eritrean War 1998.  
 
Extra systemic violent conflict occurs between the government of a state against a 
non-government group in another state. E.g. On March 1 2008, the Columbian army 
intervened in Ecuador against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 
guerrilla movement that led to the death of sixteen guerrillas including its 2nd in 
command, Raul Reyes. Both Ecuador and Venezuela were annoyed by the incident 
and amassed large military forces near the Colombian border. Also, after the 9/11 
attack, both the US and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan and defeated the Taliban 
authority in 2001, who many western commentators denied were not a government 
even though they were in control of most part of the country. 
The question is how these forms of conflict gravitate toward direct violence. One way 
of looking at this is Galtung’s conflict triangle. 
2.4.3 A Model of Conflict – Violence Formation 
Galtung’s conflict triangle
A: ATTITUDE, ASSUMPTION
B: BEHAVIOUR C: CONTRADICTION
 
It is important to note that Galtung’s triangle depicts the systemic pattern of conflict 
and violence formation. The 1st of these three basic concepts he calls 
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attitudes/assumptions (A). Attitudes and assumptions (A) form part of knowledge 
acquisition that develops inside the parties involved. These often create the 
stereotypes or part of the narratives that can influence people’s behaviour. 
Disagreement starts when the positions or interests of the parties involved are 
incompatible. These attitudes affect the way individuals behave (B). Often our 
assumptions/perceptions of life are based on ideas and feelings we use to process our 
actions and reactions through our values, cultural beliefs, information, experience and 
identity.  These perceptions are normally strong that we often call them conviction. In 
most cases, when there is disagreement each party sees the other as a threat to its 
needs or interests. These include the physical goods and comforts of life that directly 
relate to our physical wellbeing and self-fulfilment. Together they form part of 
people’s values or aspirations. These can be classed into three categories: welfare, 
power and interpersonal (Gurr, 1970:24). Welfare values are what contribute directly 
to our physical well being; power values determine the extent to which we can 
influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference of others in our lives. 
It also includes the desire to participate in collective decision-making for self-
determination and security. Interpersonal values are the psychological satisfactions 
people seek in non-authoritative interactions with others (Gurr, 1970:24).  
Finally, a conflict formation occurs when these attitudes (A) and behaviours (B) 
become overt as each party behaves with tension to the other where they cannot 
resolve their differences; it could lead to (C). Thus, conflict: A-B-C. We can illustrate 
this model with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
For example, Attitudes/Assumptions: The heart of the problem is land, which both 
the Jews and Palestinians claim as theirs; saying it was given to them by God. Thus, 
each perceives the other as having a disingenuous claim. The Jews see the 
Palestinians as intruders and the Palestinians see the Jews as occupiers. Each 
expresses hatred for the other and both have extremist groups that do not want to co-
exist with the other on the same land.  Behaviours: The Jews and Palestinians live in 
different communities, separated by barbed wire fences, each teaches its own history 
condemning the other; they hardly intermarry and each group heavily protects its turf.  
Conflicts: Without saying much, these two groups have not known peace over the last 
50 years but waves of violence Tsunami like Palestinian suicide bombings of Israelis 
and Israeli air bombings of Palestinians. 
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These forms of conflict, violence and the model of its formation are an intrinsic part 
of every society. Africa has also seen waves of these conflict and violence formations, 
and thus, it would be important that the African state be conceptualized in order to 
understand how its conflict and violence has occurred. 
2.5 Conceptualizing the State in Africa 
It is important to peer through the lens of history to conceptualize the process and 
problems of development in the African state; it is like when a patient sees a doctor 
his or her medical history is checked before a prescription is made. Africa is one vast 
and diverse continent of 53 independent states; with few exceptions, many had their 
independence in the 1960s. However, ‘to lump these states together and talk about a 
common ‘African politics’ is misleading because there are many important cultural 
differences among them; for instance, there is a wide cultural differences among the 
North African states and the states south of the Sahara, who are mainly black 
Africans’ (Tordoof, 2002:1; see Doornbos, 2005:50). The demographic and 
geographic variations are striking; e.g. Sudan and Congo Democratic Republic are the 
largest; Burundi, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Swaziland are among the smallest. 
Nigeria, situated in West Africa, is richly endowed with oil deposit and the highest 
black population of almost 124 million. Despite these variations, they have many 
things shared in common: plenty natural resources but low human and capital 
resources, low technological innovation and cash crop economies. Significantly, after 
independence the African state became synonymous with political instability, 
perennial violence, mass poverty and humanitarian catastrophes. Dire situations like 
these made some to pejoratively say that ‘Africa is a pessimist’s paradise, a place 
where the Hobbesian hypothesis, that in the absence of a political Leviathan, life for 
individuals will be nasty, brutish, and short seems to be widely manifest in everyday 
life’ (Buzan & Waever, 2003:219).  
The above scenario in the post-colonial African state raises the questions about its 
power and capacity, national identity and unity (Doornbos, 2006:49). If this has 
formed the lens of seeing the post colonial African state, how does one contextualize 
these problems? To answer this question, the early process and development of 
statehood in Africa should be looked at. 
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2.5.1 Early Statehood 
It is easy for some to assume the birth of the African state to colonialism; however, 
the notion of statehood had existed in Africa’s early history. It is useful to stress that 
both the pre and post-colonial statehood are different. During its pre-colonial era, 
there were two broad kinds of political institutions: the stateless societies 
(Acephalous) and states with centralized authority (traditional rulers) with 
administrative instruments and judicial institutions (Ayyitey, 1991). Both societies 
foreshadowed a form of communal existence whereby people’s interests were catered 
for. However, it could be wrong to construe this form of communal existence as a 
classless society (i.e. no rich or poor) because ‘there is no historical or 
anthropological evidence for any such society’ (Nkrumah, 1967:2). Also, since most 
pre-colonial political institutions depended on a strong family unit, the society was set 
up on the basis of this lineage that connected the family to the state (Oluwu, 1994:6) 
It meant the state had strong legitimacy because the society was usually based on this 
family network of clan as a way to ensure effective communication of its policies. 
The strong dislike for centralized power was responsible for the existence of stateless 
societies. According to Ayyitey, a conscious effort was made in stateless societies that 
each unit was big enough to protect itself but small enough to have internal unity. 
There was also a raison d'être in stateless societies for a centralized power because it 
could be vital for protection against outside attack. But they were also established to 
prevent against the possibility of despotism, which these states could represent. Even 
in states with a central authority there were checks against autocracy, which included 
the practice of consensus than autocracy; supernatural or religious practices like 
asking the ruler to drink poison; institutionalized sanctions like threats of deposition, 
prohibitions and revolt (Oluwu, 1994: 6). The significant point is that power and 
authority in the pre-colonial African state was based on consensus more than 
autocracy. The next phase of African statehood is associated with occupation, 
domination and exploitation of colonialism. 
 
2.5.2 The Colonial African State 
One of the greatest impacts of European industrial revolution was the era of 
imperialism. The industrial revolution was a success in Europe in terms of economic 
profit, the growth of towns, cities as a result of population expansion and surplus 
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productions. This success meant that these nations could not effectively trade among 
themselves as free trade hardly existed. Thus, there was need for these European 
industrial states to find markets where to sell the surplus production and make profit. 
This gave rise to imperialism, which ushered in the mad scramble for territorial 
markets and the birth of colonialism in waves unknown on the African continent 
around 1800 to 1945. The European powers carved out vast chunks of colonies in the 
areas they conquered and each colony was maintained by force. The pre-colonial 
institutions were extirpated in place of the new colonial policy. There is no simple 
answer as to why this was done except that it depended on the European powers 
involved. Basically, it was done for two reasons.  
First, it had to do with the theory of racial superiority prevalent at the time; that all 
conquered territories were considered to have inferior institutions, which should be 
changed. The next had to do with logistical inhibitions as each colonial power was 
short of the manpower needed to exert control. To overcome this, the British 
introduced the system of indirect rule where African traditional rulers were co-opted 
to maintain law and order. The French, Portuguese, Belgians and Germans directly 
controlled these colonies with their own personnel.  In short, the colonial state was 
‘elitist, centrist and absolutist’ (Wunsch, 1990:23). The most significant trait of the 
colonial state was that decisions were taken, which were far removed from the 
indigenes and it was the duty of the chiefs imposed to implement them or would be 
dethroned. The bequest of the colonial state was the creation of horizontal and vertical 
inequalities. A cohesive social integration was weakened vertically by the vast 
inequality created among individuals and horizontally by the inequalities among the 
various ethnic groups. In the case of Sierra Leone(S/L), the British empowered some 
of the interior ethnic groups against the krios; descendants of freed African slaves 
living in the city, who eventually took over the reins of power after independence. 
The colonial Africa state was marked with mass exploitation, vandalism and 
corruption, which the postcolonial African state came to embody. Political control 
was not by consensus; in other words, the legacy of the colonial state was the 
continuation and strengthening of autocracy. 
2.5.3 The Post-Colonial African State 
The post-colonial African state was the by-product of colonialism. But as we shall 
now see; to start with, there is often a fight within the state and it has been 
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disconnected from its pre-colonial past because it was established on a different 
philosophy, structure and organization (Oluwu, 1994:6-7). Francis argues that the 
debate of post colonial African state formation is that its “state system to a large 
extent is different from what the conventional study of international relations assumes 
the state to be; the state in Africa is in a state of flux” (2006:33).  
Weber and Brownlie’s definitions of state give a useful point of departure for 
examining the empirical and juridical aspects of this post-colonial African state 
(Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:5, Francis, 2006:34). For Weber, the state is about 
‘compulsory jurisdiction’, (1964:156), and for Brownlie, it is about an ‘effective 
government’ (1979:75). Both state definitions are similarly echoed by Zartman, who 
sees the state as the sovereign authority, the recognized and accepted source of 
authority to organize decision making; secondly, it is an institution vested with the 
authority for decision making and, hence, an intangible symbol of identity; and has 
the primary security responsibility for a populated society (1995:5).  
Brownlie’s legal definition of the state include a ‘permanent population’ and an’ 
effective government’ (1979:73-76). To reconcile Zartman’s ‘unquestionable 
authority’ and ‘intangible symbol of identity’ in the post colonial African state raises 
a question. In political sociology, societies are seen as culturally homogeneous or 
heterogeneous. Thus, if we take ‘a stable community’ to mean an integrated political 
community founded on a common culture and values, then few African states are seen 
to possess this attribute (Jackson &Rosberg,1982:5) because the population of many 
these states comprised several different ethnic groups and religions.   
As Clapham argues, the rudiments given to states by the Westphalia legacy do not 
reflect the reality of statehood in Africa (1996:12). Every aspect of the state has been 
challenged, or weakened by the diverse locations of power within it, which has led to 
a wide gap between its exercise of international and internal sovereignty (Francis, 
2006:36). Ayoob argues it was the chequered legacy of colonialism, which laid the 
foundation for a weak post colonial state that ‘led to arbitrary and cavalier 
construction of political boundaries across ethnic, linguistic and religious ties and 
bound them into an uneasy political union’ (1995). The creation of nation-states were 
non-existed could have impacted the gradual state building process, which as Francis 
says, the post-colonial African state cannot effectively control its citizens because this 
Westphalia system slowed its strong nation building (2006:33). Well, if this was an 
unwanted inheritance, then as Mazuri argues, the problem of dealing with the various 
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ethnic groups made it impossible to consolidate its authority after independence, 
because in some societies the many ethnic groups maintained their separate identities 
by being ruled partly through their own native institutions (1986:122), and in some 
societies, where traditional rulers lost their power, they refused to accept the political 
change. 
Having the many different cultures or ethnic groups is less the problem than how 
social constructions like ethnicity, are used as a means of getting and maintaining 
power at the expense of other social groups in the post-colonial African state. The 
post-colonial African state’s ability to exercise control over these many social groups 
raises the question of means. Such means are considered in terms of legitimacy and 
the ability to govern (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:6). This ability to exercise control 
could depend on certain internal factors of power distribution, resource allocation and 
the sense of one national identity. But as we discussed above, these boundaries were 
for the convenience of the colonial powers, which was to force the indigenous people 
to be homogenous by creating nation-states in places it did not exist. But people will 
always find ways to make their differences more visible. As we now see, the latter has 
been a problem due to several concerns, namely ethnicity. 
Cohen defines ethnicity as "a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness"(1978:373).  In this post-colonial state, other groups are excluded from 
political power and economic resources. In some parts of the state, ethnicity is not 
static; it constantly evolves often as a strategy of the ruling elite to consolidate their 
hold on power and the ordinary people use it as a way to survive. But where ethnicity 
has been used a deliberate ploy to deprived other groups, civil wars have occurred. 
For example: Sudan (1956 to date); Rwanda (1959-1964; 1994); Chad (1966 to date); 
Nigeria (1967-1970) and Angola (1957 to 1997). 
Thus, conceptualisations of the post-colonial African state reveal a discrepancy 
between its juridical and empirical sovereignty. It has enjoyed the status of state 
created on the basis of international law but it lacks empirical sovereignty in real term 
of resources and governance, which could explain why it is in a continuous flop to 
command a huge stock of and prudently manage its resources for the people.  
 
In the immediate post-independence period, the notion of what the state should be is 
subsumed under two main development approaches:  the statist approach and the neo-
liberal approach (i.e. structural adjustment programs). There were two aspects of the 
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statist approach: the collectivization of economic power; concentration of political 
power in the state. The collectivization of economic power was to monopolize the 
economic bread baskets either by a policy of socialization or nationalization of all its 
key primary industries (Wunsch&Oluwu, 1990) as a way to boost development 
because it was faced with economic problems and few industries. Many leaders of this 
post-colonial state turned to the east, like China, as an alternative to capitalism and 
were influenced by socialist ideas, especially with regard to agriculture. Some leaders 
believed this socialism, as it were, would pave the way to economic development. For 
instance, in Tanzania, President Nyeyere wanted to construct a socialist state from the 
country’s million peasants through village cooperatives, named Ujamas, which was 
similar to the collectivisation of small farms in the former USSR. Initially, the 
Tanzanian peasants massively resisted the programme but they were forcefully moved 
into other villages and their traditional customs destroyed. It was the creation of 
violence unknown to the African peoples and a wide distrust between them (Wunsch 
& Oluwu, 1990) and it was dictatorial because the consent of the people was not 
required.  
 
In terms of scope, there was concentration of political power in the state as it broadly 
expanded its responsibilities, which as Laski says, was a problem because it tried to 
provide all the agenda for every institution within its authority (1982). There were two 
problems involved here. First, it was not about the lack of resources per se: human or 
natural than institutional and procedural failures (Olaitan, 2005:1). The other was the 
human agency. Since it seemed that many of these leaders were foremost in the 
struggle for independence, they saw the state as their own private space. Hence, many 
went on to present their people with no choice in so-called referenda to declare them 
leaders for life, e.g. Kamuzu Banda (Malawi); Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya); Siaka Stevens 
(Sierra Leone); Leopold Senghor (Senegal). It came at a price, where political 
opposition, free speech was quelled; power was instead centralized in the hands of 
few, a contradiction to pre-colonial societies where power was by consensus than 
imposition (Ayyitey, 1991:99). There was disengagement between the leadership and 
the critical mass of its population. For example, the state conducts its official 
activities in the language of the colonial power while most of the population are 
uneducated, who only understand their mother tongue, meaning that actions are not 
taken in the interests of their people nor do these leaders follow public opinion. It is a 
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maxim in governance that all state officials understand that their office is expected to 
give results, of which they should give account to the citizens whose interest they 
serve. Inevitably, this iron curtain as it were, has entrenched the pathology of 
unaccountable leadership and bankruptcy, where the post colonial state became 
reminiscent of the centralized and criminalized colonial state. Also, the state was 
dysfunctional by its inability to exert an effective control over its territory and raise 
tax (Herbst, 1990, Jackson& Rosberg, 1982; Clapham, 1996 and Hyden, 1980). As its 
scope of action expanded modestly on key public infrastructure, there were some 
internal limitations, which as Doornbos says, it faced the question how could it 
establish and strengthen its link with the different social locations of power and the 
extent of autonomy it has granted them (Doornbos, 2006:50). 
 
Interestingly, what is slipping under the radar of this statist approach in the post-
colonial state is the cold war politics. During the cold war, the state was caught in a 
somewhat ideological limbo of the East-West divide of capitalist or socialist 
doctrines. Theoretically, the post-colonial state was non-aligned; yet practically, many 
had a hybrid of socialism or capitalism. One has to understand the official and 
practical agenda behind the aid given to the post colonial African state by the cold 
war rivals. The official line was normative about development but empirically, it was 
strengthening the state. It supported political dictatorship and not the democratization 
of state institutions. It was evident that political power went with economic wealth as 
a result of such foreign aids. For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone(S/L), the APC 
government of President Siaka Stevens benefitted greatly by receiving enough aid and 
other resources from these powers. However, these were not used to deliver the 
political goods than paying key political figures in return for their obedience and 
loyalty from their supporters (Reno, 1995; Ayoob, 1995).  
 
The neo-liberal approach at the end of the 70s brought a new debate about the role of 
the state in development. In this debate, the state was seen as an obstacle to efficient 
market, repressive and dependent on foreign powers for support (Mkandawire, 2004). 
It was this quagmire and financial mismanagement of the post-colonial state, which 
made the international financial institutions to pull the strings out of its sail, leading to 
a change of fortune or the beginning of its end I would say. Its inability in terms of 
capacity and performance to catch up with the other continents made it the most 
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vilified object of the 90s (Doornbos, 2006; Mkandawire, 1990). It has been given 
many epithets: rentier, over extended, patrimonial and kleptocratic. But why is it so? 
 
The effect of the world market prices for its raw material resources in the early 70s 
affected the state’s revenue generating capacity. With little revenue the state could not 
adequately provide the basic needs of its citizens. Arguably, since the leaders did not 
want to abandon their power, the state became rentier, patrimonial and kleptocratic to 
compensate their supporters and oppositions. Such epithets are meant to depict the 
abnormal political and socio-economic conditions of this post colonial state, which 
cannot do anything on its own but dependent on the international community for its 
survival. The international financial institutions came up with policies that were 
considered the panacea of its economic and political development. The state was 
asked to reduce itself from its state-centric responsibilities, to stabilize and privatize 
its economy, and instructed to engage in democratization and creating an enabling 
environment for private sector investment. It resulted in what became known as the 
rolling back of the state (Doornbos, 2006; Mkandawire, 1994) when the international 
financial institutions ‘decided to reverse their appreciation for it and opted out for 
what ‘appear, an almost anarchic route’ (Doornbos,2006:56). The impact was a state 
completely left out in the cold, with NGOs, private sectors and local communities 
attempting to implement policies of poverty reduction and development, which was 
its traditional burden of responsibility. This consequently led to the weakening of the 
post-colonial state, e.g. Ghana and S/L in the early 80s. 
The statist approach was notorious for its corruption and embezzling of resources by 
government officials without being accountable to anyone. The power game resulted 
in the struggle over control of its resources and possibilities (Braathen et al.2000: 10). 
And where political power has always complement economic wealth, acquisition of 
state power has been a key source of conflict (Osman, 2007:19). The state has been 
ungovernable because it exists as an institution severed from its people and is 
struggling to justify its existence. For e.g. are the recent clashes in Nigeria, where 
from 1998 to date, the federal government has been facing an uphill battle with the 
local Ijaw youths of the Niger Delta state; one of the country’s oil-rich producing 
states, over the problem of adequately allocating or investing the oil resources in the 
state. These Ijaw youths, an ethnic militia group, have been abducting foreign oil 
companies’ executives in return for huge ransom prices. The scramble for the oil 
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resources has seen hundreds of local people killed in oil pipe explosions as they 
destroyed these pipes to steal and pour fuel into their plastic gallons. In other areas, 
the competition for the oil has increased violent conflicts among the many ethnic 
groups, leading to near militarization of entire areas by ethnic militias or the state 
security personnel. This is a clear sign where the post-colonial African state’s 
legitimacy is generally contested with violent conflicts, and has struggled to maintain 
control over such contested areas; since it has become not a state for all but those few 
who are fortunate to be at the power center (Ake, 1989). This is an attribute of its own 
internal cause of state weakness. 
Summarizing the above, both the statist and neo-liberalist approaches did not work to 
make the post-colonial state strong as was intended. The statist approach instituted an 
expanded scope beyond its ability to cope. For Fukuyama (2004:39–40), the neo-
liberal approach helped in sinking the competence of the African state. It was done by 
using external specialists or economic influence to control strategic and policy-
making functions in a hurry to provide services to consumers as opposed to 
strengthening state institutions to deliver these public goods. The neo-liberal approach 
of rolling back the state in the early 1980s did not create a strong, democratic and 
prosperous economic state as was intended. Instead, it added an extra weight on the 
state weakness, which eventually bent it beyond recovery. This destroyed the 
development of human capital as people did not get better social services like 
education and health. Ironically, there has been a change of fortune; others in the past, 
who saw the state as ineffective, are now calling for its return to take up the burden of 
development, which many of the neo-liberal institutions like NGOs have been unable 
to replace. 
 
We have seen from the above how political power in the post-colonial state has been 
constantly and highly contested. Since political power has always been the key to 
economic wealth in the post-colonial state, the ‘capturing and maintaining of state 
power has been a key source of conflict and political violence across the continent’ 
(Osman, 2007:19). In this regard, I now look at how this political economy of the 
post-colonial state feeds into the violent conflict of Sierra Leone. 
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2.6 Contextualizing the political economy of the violent conflict in Sierra Leone  
What is political economy and does it have any relationship with weak states and 
violent conflict? Political economy has to do with power structures and economic 
relations, combined to strengthen a nation and provide for the citizens. In every 
political society, the general basic needs are applied to judge whether a state is good 
(strong) or bad (weak). As every society consists of the haves and have-nots, it 
becomes the state’s responsibility that all its social units are catered for. However, it 
does not necessary follow that the policies are always equitable. In essence, what 
political economy does is to analyze how these institutions operate within any state, 
how the scarce resources are allocated through the economic system and how the 
citizens react to their government. This approach seeks to explain if a political 
institution is able to effectively control people if it negates its responsibility to them. 
Concepts like obedience and patriotism on the part of citizens are only valid if their 
liberty and basic needs are satisfied by the state. In short, it is both a normative and 
empirical claim that some governments can earn, especially in western liberal 
democracies, their legitimacy when they attend to their people’s basic needs. For 
instance, in these western liberal democracies, people give their consent to be 
governed where the leadership is expected to fulfil their expectation but when nothing 
is done, there is a tendency for them to ask something else of their government, 
including a call for a new election. Unlike non-western countries where there are no 
liberal democratic governments, this normative and empirical claim is hardly seen. 
 
Considering this, Sierra Leone’s (S/L) weak state was characterized by lack of good 
governance and problems of legitimacy (Jackson, 2002:38), which was a continuation 
of the colonial state’s exploitative and divisive politics. It was incapable to foster 
stable and accountable state institutions to meet the citizens’ needs, empowering them 
to improve their lives through the rule of law. Weak states also show signs of ‘mono 
economies12, economic underdevelopment, heavy debts burdens, and low growth 
rates, high level of inflation and unemployment’ (Jackson 2002:39).  It is against this 
backdrop, where the key responsibility of states is to deliver political goods: security, 
health, education and economic opportunities (Potter, 2004:2), S/L was a weak state. 
                                               
12 Countries whose economic dependence is on one particular kind of industry, which could be 
agricultural products like cocoa, coffee, phosphate, e.t.c, whose world market prices are too small to 
make a difference in revenue gains. 
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The deficiency of these state functions is the foundation of bad governance and the 
key question here is whether the government was able, willing or not to perform its 
functions. 
 
As in some states popular legitimacy is partly based on performance and the provision 
of basic needs. Thus, in S/L, the government’s capacity to address these concerns 
became painful and punishingly slow to realize, leading to its legitimacy crises 
(Magbaily Fyle, 1993:17). Although this might seem a questionable claim, legitimacy 
could be determined by the right and free participation of citizens to elect their 
government in any election; however, the first thing the All Peoples Congress (APC) 
did was to fine tune the country into a one party state in 1978. I say fine tune because 
this was an idea initiated by the ruling SLPP government, which Stevens opposed 
when he was opposition leader.  
This meant political exclusion and limited participation except to those who were 
party supporters. Since the government could not guarantee itself wide support, it 
resorted to many violent means. Its poor legitimacy became evident with very low 
level of citizens political participation, a reliance on force to ensure compliance, 
unstable politics like coups and the centralization of power that was focused on the 
ruling elite (Jackson 2002, p 38). In addition, the problem of governance and 
economic decline was worsened by the impact of globalization and the poor prices of 
primary exports (Jackson 1990; Reno 1995; Ayoob 1995).  
It is significant that the policies of international financial institutions in rolling back 
the state in the early 1980s added an extra weight on the state weakness. It was unable 
to effectively provide the basic socio-economic needs and there was a massive 
inequality between the rich and poor. It is this growing inequality of income and 
wealth between the rich and poor, absence of necessary material goods, and the often 
decomposition from conflict to violence that has characterized the post-colonial 
African state, thus the lack of state capabilities for effective governance from both the 
administrations of President Stevens and Momoh created the seedbed of state and 
economic decline that contributed to the RUF’s insurgency in 1991 (Reno, 1995; 
Magbaily Fyle 1993; Alie, 2001; Gberie 2004). 
We have seen from this political economy approach how S/L experienced the 
pathology of state weakness. The weak state pathology does not automatically 
transcend to mass political violence but when violent conflicts break out in some post-
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colonial state they become endemic and escalate. So, one approach that could help us 
to understand the nature of this mass political violence in S/L is protracted social 
conflict.  
2.6.1 The Protracted Social Conflict in Sierra Leone 
A protracted social conflict has to do with the issues of identity, inequalities and 
frustrations, which could lead to organized violence. Thus, it represents "…the 
prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as 
security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic 
participation"(Azar, 1990:93). Azar defines four clusters or variables as preconditions 
for PSC: communal discontent of a society, human needs, the state's role and 
international linkages (Azar, 1990: 7-12).  In Sierra Leone, the communal discontent 
of the society was very important in the violent conflict; the communal discontent 
from the political domination of a single ethnic group caused largely by colonial 
policy. Thus, the British colonial policy of divide and rule directly influenced an 
ethnic and regional rivalry in the country (Azar, 1990: 7; Migdal, 1988). In some 
areas, strong traditional rulers were replaced with those sympathetic to British 
interest; particular ethnic groups had right to rule at the expense of others (Migdal, 
1988). Those traditional rulers who had lost their power refused to cooperate, and 
some ethnic groups refused to pay local tax to traditional rulers belonging to another 
ethnic group.  
After independence, there emerged three leading ethnic groups vying for dominance. 
However, a single ethnic group; the Mendes, came to dominate the other ethnic 
groups since they had more educated people. The Mendes benefitted from education 
due to several factors. First, the early Christian missionary penetration in the southern 
part took with them education, while the northern ethnic groups were influence by 
Islam and even though they had limited access to missionary activities, they were 
suspicious.  Also, when the British were facing a constant pressure from the educated 
Freetown Krio elite, the British deliberately established the 1st interior secondary 
school in the southern district of Bo, called the Bo school in 1906 for the sons of 
traditional rulers as a way to weaken this educated Krio elite. Arguably, over the years 
the Mendes benefitted greatly from this. They became the dominant group during the 
independence struggle, who inevitably took over from the departing British. But the 
problem started when they tried to exclude and ignore the needs of the other social 
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groups, thereby breeding frustration and polarization, which led to the formation of 
the opposition APC party; an amalgamation of all the various ethnic groups in the 
northern and western region of the country (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:4). 
 
In terms of human needs, just as Azar argued, all individuals aim at fulfilling their 
collective needs through their collective group identity. Thus, when people’s basic 
needs are deprived it leads to increasing grievances, which individuals could express 
collectively (Azar, 1990: 7-10). There are different forms of needs: such as political 
access, security and acceptance or integration, which may refer to people’s religious 
and cultural expression of identity. In Sierra Leone, the security needs was the 
material concerns for physical safety, nutrition and housing among the population. It 
is important that Azar’s concept of human needs explicitly takes up the idea of power 
inequalities. The dominant social group satisfies its interests to political access and 
security at the expense of the other ethnic groups needs.  
 
In S/L, after the political turmoil of the late 60s, the dominant group was no longer a 
single ethnic group. If Cohen’s definition of ethnicity is "a series of nesting 
dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness"(Cohen, 1978:373), then what 
happened in S/L was not about the exclusion of different ethnic groups but the 
inclusion of class. The political institution became a group of individuals from among 
the leading ethnic groups. To start with, the President who was Limba (the 3rd largest 
northern ethnic group) was married to a Mende (the 1st largest ethnic group from the 
southeast); his 1st Vice President was a Limba and was also married to a Mende; his 
2nd Vice President was a Temne (the 2nd largest northern ethnic group) was married to 
a Susu (another northern ethnic group). The Chief Justice happened to be a Mende as 
well; the Bank Governor happened to be a Temne and later a Krio as well (the 
descendants of the freed slaves). In addition, when it came to parliamentary 
representations, almost all the eighteen ethnic groups were represented; most of the 
ministerial positions were also held by members of the southeast (i.e. the Mendes) 
since they had more educated people than the other ethnic groups. Thus, it was 
understandable why the other classes became frustrated, felt bitterly discriminated and 
excluded from the socio-economic and political participation of the country. The state 
as power broker was not capable of mediating a level of need satisfaction for the other 
classes. The result was a growing disarticulation between the state and society; where 
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the APC government state increasingly pursued policies that were contradictory to the 
general needs of its people (Azar, 1990:11; Gberie, 2004:34-35). 
 
The question of governance or the state’s role is pivotal in the delivery of group 
needs. Azar believes that most states going through protracted social conflicts are 
governed by ‘incompetent, parochial, fragile, authoritarian regimes’ (Azar, 1990: 10). 
In Sierra Leone, given the rather fragile structures of authority, the power capacity 
and economic access needs were limited to the dominant APC elite at the expense of 
all other groups. The monopolization of power by the APC resulted in "crises of 
legitimacy" as the state was no longer able to meet the political access, security and 
economic needs of the excluded groups. Finally, as Azar says, the leadership of the 
state in most protracted social conflicts is increasingly dependent on international 
linkages; that is, the state is politically and economically compromised by both 
economic and military dependency on richer and stronger states for survival (Azar, 
1990: 11). During the cold war, the APC government received enough aid and other 
resources from the G7 powers and the former USSR. However, these were not used to 
deliver the political goods than paying key political figures in return for their 
obedience and loyalty to the APC (Reno, 1995; Ayoob, 1995).  
 
2.7 Towards a Conceptual Model 
A conceptual model is a general method used to describe an idea about some topic in 
a pictorial form13, or having the concepts often within shapes and the relationship 
between the concepts shown by a connecting line linking the concepts14. The 
conceptual model of weak states will be illustrated with the following diagram below. 
                                               
13 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/  
14 http://cmap.ihmc.us/Publications/ResearchPapers/TheoryCmaps/TheoryUnderlyingConceptMaps.htm  
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Weak State/Basic Needs Violent Conflict
Legitimacy  Crises Disputes/Tensions 
 
In order to explain the relationships, the weak state indicators of Rotberg under the 
four concepts will be used.  
2.7.1 Weak States and Basic Needs 
The categorization of a state is determined by basic needs. Let me be clear about the 
arrows. Initially, violent conflict does not lead to weak state; it is the weak state that 
could lead to violent conflict. But as the arrows show, there is feed back, where 
violent conflict could also further weaken a state.  It is the duration and intensity of it 
that could lead to the scenario postulated by Rotberg and Zartman, i.e. failed or 
collapsed state; that is, if the latter is a possibility. The limitation of this conceptual 
model is that it cannot explain what a strong state is, what are the relationships of a 
strong state (in terms of what), it does not answer the question of whether a weak state 
automatically transcend into violent conflict, or is it not possible for a weak state to 
become strong. Instead, what I have tried to do is to explain what happens in one case, 
which is S/L. 
 
Weak States: A state is the political institution of any political defined territory, 
whose key task includes the four core functions of statehood: providing security; 
maintaining legitimate political institutions; fostering economic growth; and meeting 
its people's basic needs. Weak states provide a poor delivery of basic needs, which 
could erode their legitimacy or a potential for violent conflict. This was borne out in 
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S/L where the government’s inability to provide these needs lead to many legitimacy 
crises, disputes and the inevitable violent conflict. But this will be analyzed further in 
Chapter 4.   
Basic needs are the daily human concerns in all societies: right to life (security), 
liberty (freedom), and the pursuit of happiness (welfare and property).Gross 
inequalities may be an indicator of basic needs not provided by the state. It could also 
be to the absence of physical or political discrimination on the basis of identity (i.e. 
age, sex, race, belief, and language) or it could also mean the political representation 
of people within a state. In other words, since it is impossible to have the Athens form 
of democracy where everyone can have a voice, representation has to do with the 
election of politicians on behalf of their constituencies. In the developed countries, 
democracy is complemented by the role of civil societies and social capital.  
 
Though basic needs are normally about food, shelter, protection of life and property, it 
is important to note that it is subject to space and time, meaning it is not static but 
could be relative15. In the US, for instance, it is about paying bills, health care, 
education and making ends meet16; in the UK, it is about education. In Africa, it is 
about things taken for granted in the developed countries like food, health and clean 
drinking water17. Let us reflect, in the mid 17th and 18th centuries, the concept of 
democracy (political participation) was not an important issue in many states, 
including the western countries; however, with the passing of time, it has become the 
foundation toward good governance, peace, and security within and among nation-
states. In fact, women’s right to vote was first granted in New Zealand 1893, followed 
by Australia and the Scandinavian countries before the rest of Western Europe and the 
USA. 
It is without dispute that democracy has also led to violent conflicts in some states; 
although some can argue to the contrary it is not democracy. We take S/L for 
instance, its first post independence general elections in 1967, led to disputes with the 
incumbent Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) government to instigate the military to 
overthrow the All Peoples Congress (APC) from assuming office. Also, the decision 
of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo to declare its independence from Serbia 
                                               
15 http://www.guardian.co.uk/ society/2005/jul/05/socialexclusion.politics-  The Guardian Newspaper 
16 http: //www.census.gov/prod/ -US Census Demographic Data    
17 http://www.unesco.org./water/wwap/facts figures/basic needs.shtml  
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is another example. Some countries within the EU and the US recognised it but 
Russia, Spain and Greece opposed it. Some elections by voting could be a sign of but 
is not democracy, e.g. the recent election frauds of 2002 & 2008 in Zimbabwe where 
the ZANUPF has rendered the opposition powerless. Nor is the act of some 
democracy synonymous with good governance, as in the case of Russia, where 
President Yeltsin handpicked his successor, Putin, in 1999, who later won the 
presidential elections in 2000. President Putin also chose his successor, Dmitry 
Medvedev, in 2008, because he had reached his presidential term limits. After the 
contested Presidential election, which Medvedev won, President Putin handed power 
and was sworn in as Russia’s Prime Minister. 
Or should one mention the recent electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine, which the 
US and Israel did not accept as a legitimate government because it is seen as a 
terrorist organization? It was interesting that President Bush's focus on democracy in 
the Middle East is one of double standards. Hamas was strengthened because the U.S. 
insisted that democratic elections be held in the Palestinian Authority. Thus, these are 
some of the problems in contextualizing political participation (democracy) as a basic 
need. I could go on with many examples to explain the controversies or relativity of 
the concept of basic needs. Can the separatist movements in Chechnya (Russia), 
Basque (Spain), the PKK (Turkey) and the IRA (Ireland) be seen as the denial of 
basic needs, of which the right of self-determination could be seen as constituent part 
of basic needs? But the great problem is who can decide or whose right of self 
determination. It shows the difficulty to talk about self-determination as basic need.  
We could see this clearly in some of the countries just mentioned, where the denial of 
the right of self determination has led to violent conflict. In the post-colonial African 
state, there have been few crises of groups claiming right of self determination, except 
those of Biafra civil war in Nigeria (1967-70), the Eritreans in Ethiopia (1988-91). 
 
We can also take the issue of slavery. It was not seen by the slave trading nations as 
the denial of people’s basic needs and the rebellion of slaves; especially in Haiti, 1804 
that saw the independence of a first slave state, was against the denial of their freedom 
(basic need). In addition, one could also say that the Anti-slavery movement was a 
civil society in the true sense of the word; though it was localised and not 
internationalized like some of the human rights organizations we now have. This is 
why in my own estimation, the concept of human rights is still a problem in some 
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states; we rightly or wrongly call weak, failed and collapsed states, being accepted as 
an element of basic needs. In short, these states see human rights as a western cultural 
value, which is being imposed on them. But one could say that basic needs is about 
good governance and human security; though it could be related or restricted to space 
and time as we have discussed. Normatively, ‘if human development is freedom from 
want (a process widening the range of people’s choices), human security can be 
understood as the ability to pursue those choices in a safe and equitable 
environment’18. 
2.7.2 Legitimacy Crises 
As illustrated on the conceptual model, when a weak state cannot adequately provide 
its citizens basic needs, there is a tendency for it to experience legitimacy crises. This 
is a critical and often troublesome concept in politics because of the many ways it is 
used; thus an accepted definition is often elusive (Weber, 1947; Lipset, 1963; 
Beetham, 1991). Somewhat, the most basic distinction is between its normative and 
empirical meaning. The normative aspect concerns itself with values by which a 
regime or action is said to be legitimate, or why citizens should obey a government 
and under what conditions its authority is legitimate. The empirical aspect explains 
why or when citizens do obey or revolt against any political institution. In short, it 
concerns more about whether the normative values people hold are met rather than 
debating which values should hold.  
Lipset makes a useful distinction between legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimacy 
he says is ‘the capacity of the system to engender and maintain belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’. Effectiveness, in 
contrast, ‘means actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic 
functions of government as most of the population and such powerful groups within it 
as big business or the armed forces see them (Lipset, 1963:4). We now discuss the 
likelihood of how this conceptual model fit into S/L and other states legitimacy crises. 
 
In S/L, this legitimacy question was indicated in rigged elections and poor electoral 
turn out, which as seen from the conceptual model led to disputes, tensions in some 
parts of the country (this is discussed fully in chapter 4). However, one has to be 
cautious with poor electoral turnouts to determine legitimacy. In some western 
                                               
18 http://www.iss.co.za/).Institute for Security Studies in South Africa 
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countries like Australia, the UK, France and the US, often elections have had less than 
55% turn out, yet these governments legitimacy are beyond doubt.  
The normative aspect of legitimacy against the violent overthrow of a government 
raises the question of when and why a government is considered to have support. Let 
me briefly clarify the difference between support and legitimacy with dejure and 
defacto sovereignty. In international law, sovereignty is the exclusive political 
authority of states as opposed to individuals. Dejure sovereignty is the legal right 
conferred on a state by the constitution to exert its authority (i.e. by law) and defacto 
is the practical working of sovereignty in terms of the people’s support for a 
government (a synonym for popular legitimacy). For instance, it is possible for a 
military coup, which are normally considered unconstitutional, to have initial support 
but its legitimacy could wane in the long run if it does not live up to the people’s 
expectations. To measure something that is intangible like expectations might seem 
vague, but we could use the recent political turmoil in Pakistan to explain it. In 1999, 
the Pakistani military General, Pervez Musharaff, seized power. Later in 2001, he was 
elected President but then came under fire in 2007 for dismissing some Supreme 
Court judges opposed to his politics. In S/L, when the NPRC military regime seized 
power in 1992 it had wide support but lost its legitimacy by 1996 when it was obvious 
they too were corrupt and undemocratic like the APC government they ousted. 
 
2.7.3 Disputes / Tensions 
Politics defines what people care enough about to fight about. In real terms, people 
have irreconcilable differences, conflict of opposing ideas, attitudes or goals. Often it 
is an unfortunate difference between two opinions or situations. In some states, the 
issue of legitimacy has led to disputes and tensions.  For example, in S/L, the 
imposition of one party rule by the All Peoples Congress (APC) government, 1978, 
led to several disputes and tensions, as people opposed the APC.  Also, the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, 2004, was witnessed by many acts of civil disobedience and 
public protests organized by the opposition, over the alleged rigging of votes for the 
incumbent President, Viktor Yuschenko.The public protests succeeded when the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court annulled the result and ordered a run-off, which was 
eventually won by the opposition, Viktor Yanukovych. Pakistan offers another 
example where legitimacy and support ‘ continues to be one of despotic regimes using 
 43
religious extremists and external support to keep the secular democratic forces at bay; 
and when these forces do assert themselves, to tie them down in legal constraints that 
are designed to ensure their failure’19. In other words, though seemingly strong, yet is 
weak as it shares authority with the tribal areas that have not known central authority 
for many decades after independence in 1949. 
 
2.7.4 Violent Conflict  
It is defined as the systematic breakdown of the social order resulting from and/or 
leading to changes in social norms, which involve mass violence instigated through 
collective action (see SIDA, 2005:4; Gurr, 1970:23; Stewart, 2000). This notion 
includes violent protests, riots, coups, revolutions, civil wars, genocide, international 
wars and terrorism. In some states, poor legitimacy could lead to violent conflict. For 
example, in S/L, as we shall see later, the weak state crises led to an outbreak of a 
violent conflict that lasted for over a decade. Other example was the recent violent 
ethnic clashes in Kenya over the alleged rigged 2007 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. In a similar vein, the early process of state formation was not an easy 
construction in many states; it was one filled incomprehensible savagery and 
destruction. In recent times, it is the attempt of breaking up the state what some called 
nationalist wars, e.g. the Balkan Wars of the 90s, including Kosovo, 1997-1999, 
Chechnya in Russia, the Kurds in Turkey and the Basques in Spain.  
Still, the question is weak state a 21st century phenomenon or is there a relationship 
between weak states and violent conflicts? As we see next, the weak state 
phenomenon is not a novelty in international politics. 
 
2.7.5 Historical examples of weak states and violent conflicts 
The notion behind the famous quote of the American Declaration of Independence, 
1776, mirrors the relationship between a weak state and violent conflict: 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness; when a long train of abuses and usurpations, 
pursuing invariably … a design to reduce them (i.e. the people) under absolute 
                                               
19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6940148.stm   
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Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to 
provide new Guards for their future security. 
 
From this excerpt it could be argued that states exist to provide and protect these basic 
needs and they owe their legitimacy from the people and the rule of law. And where a 
government fails and becomes unhelpful to achieve these ends, it is the right of the 
people to change it with a new one to meet these needs. And one of the main reason 
the American colonists revolted against the British crown was the creed ‘no taxation 
without representation’, which was a clear call for legitimacy. In other words, they 
were not going to pay taxes to a crown that resided in Britain, while they had no 
representation in the British parliament. A closer look at the American declaration has 
or was a reflection of Locke’s idea of the state created not for itself but for the general 
welfare of the society; that men have a social contract with their government to secure 
their life and property, in which men are free to break what he called the bond of 
servitude. Locke’s idea was the pioneering work of human rights based on two key 
tenets: liberty and property. Like Hobbes, Locke shed light on human nature and the 
dangers posed to all in a lawless society. In his Second Treatise of Government, his 
first premise was the equality of all humanity, and said, God created all men naturally 
equal, each man was free “to order their action and dispose their possessions and 
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, 
or depending on the will of other men”20.  
 
Let us again see how this played a few years later in France, 1789. The French 
Revolution as the conflict between a influential, growing middle class and an 
unshakable upper crust protecting its privileges has great bearing in summarizing this 
weak state and violent conflict phenomenon. The fact that France practiced feudalism 
in the 18th century: its society was stratified and the nobles and clergy enjoyed special 
privileges that did not have to pay taxes; the common people did not have power and 
freedom in politics; worked hard and had to pay heavy taxes typified a weak state. 
The people’s basic need was not adequately provided by the monarchy. The nobles 
and clergy made up the first and second group in the country. The common people i.e. 
the middle class -bourgeoisie, peasants and artisans- made up the third group. The 
                                               
20 Locke , Second Treatise of Government Ch 2:4 
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nobles and clergy could outvote the common people easily in a so-called parliament 
that was hardly called by the king, who ruled as an absolute monarch. The common 
people became discontented with the privileged classes. In short, the problem 
remained and worsened because of the monarchy's inability to tap the wealth of the 
nation by taxation; France was a great paradox of being rich with a government in 
poverty. The deteriorating finances of the government and the prolonged differences 
of inequality between this middle class and the nobility triggered the violent conflict 
of 1789. The rational of this argument is to show that a bunch of greedy leadership-a 
reflection of bad governance and mass exploitation-, which wanted power and money 
at the mainstream society’s expense, caused this turmoil. As usually said, it seems this 
problem of history repeats itself; even in many third world states today, these are the 
problems that eventually lead and are still leading to violent conflict in the future. 
 
2.8 Summary of the theoretical discussion 
The outbreak of the violent conflict in Sierra Leone that has been stressed on its 
unique post-modern nature or by reducing it to irrational outbursts of ‘ancient ethnic 
hatred’ or a “primitive instinct for violence” (Kaplan, 1994) was totally misleading. 
What was required is a reconstruction of the historical development and epoch, taking 
into account the structural dynamics, which conditioned the emergence and behaviour 
of the actors (Gantzel, 1997:139). Although the violent conflict in S/L was rooted in 
this historical weak state framework, it cannot claim to be a formal causal model but 
could be a useful tool in understanding these kinds of conflicts (Jackson, 2002:37), 
such as economic crisis, identity politics, authoritarian and exclusionary political 
structures, power struggles, and legitimacy crises, which are often interconnected in 




In the last chapter, I attempted to examine the relationship between weak states and 
violent conflicts. This chapter proceeds to describe the method that used to explore 
the research questions. It was a qualitative empirical methodology and was chosen 
because the focus and collection of the data was based on a single case study process. 
A case study is ideal when the researcher intends to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions, when the researcher has little control over the events; unlike methods of 
experiment, which deals with existing events within a real-life context (Yin in 
Swanstrom, 2002:67).  
3.1 Case Study and Process Tracing 
The method of process tracing (or triangulation) is adopted because it is defined as the 
method where multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single 
inference or case (Gerring, 2007:173). The question of doing a case study is what we 
can learn from it. A case is either simple or complex; it is one among many and is 
purposive, and thus, it ‘is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be 
studied. By whatever methods, we choose to study the case’ (Stake, 2003:134). It 
could provide an effective medium to fully investigate the particular among the 
general.  
A case study serves three purposes: identity, explanation, or control (White 1992, in 
Stake, 2003: 138). Now, how does this relate to my research? Since process tracing 
usually involves long causal links (Gerring, 2007), the explanatory approach is 
adopted. As a deductive study, I intend to test the theory by finding evidence from 
this single case of the relationship between weak states and violent conflicts. 
However, the limitation is that it is difficult to make generalization from a single case. 
 
3.2 Data collection  
Data are not inherently qualitative or quantitative but could be piece of almost 
anything. They do not necessarily have to be expressed in numbers; they can take the 
form of words, images, and impressions, which represent reality of the people 
involved (Lofland, 1984).  In doing research, there is no standard way of choosing 
methods than what is most relevant to achieve at the time, depending on space and 
one’s interaction with respondents. 
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3.2.1 Setting  
Sierra Leone has 12 districts divided into four regional headquarters: West, East, 
North and South, for administrative purposes.  These areas of investigation were 
chosen because it was important to have inputs from a cross section of the population. 
However, since it was impossible to cover the 12 districts, the respective regional 
headquarter districts was where the research was conducted.  The Western area was 
chosen because it is the capital.  
 
In the Eastern region, the three districts of Kailahun, Kono and Kenema were 
significant during the violent conflict. It was strategic to all the warring factions. 
There the conflict heightened as each faction struggled to gain control of the rich 
diamond fields of Kono; it was the entry and exit points from Kailahun where the 
violent conflict started in March 1991. Kailahun was the RUF’s headquarter in 1991 
until after the peace and disarmament process in 2001. Kenema is the districts 
headquarter for the eastern region and has the military’s largest 2nd barrack. Many 
Liberian refugees lived and it was there another Liberian ethnic faction was formed 
(ULIMO), which attacked the Charles Taylor’s NPFL, in Liberia. In Kono, I wanted 
to find out the link between the diamonds and the violent conflict.  Since it was also 
very close to the Liberian and Guinean borders, it became the RUF’s main entry and 
exit point in its war efforts with logistics and the illegal trade of goods. 
 
For the southern region, the district headquarter of Bo was chosen.  The town of Bo 
was significant for many reasons. Firstly, it has the country’s 4th largest military 
barracks and it was where the large scale civil resistance against the RUF started. 
There the civil-military relations took a twist for the worse between the CDF (Civil 
Defense Forces) known as the Kamajors and the Army after the return to democratic 
rule in 1996. As discussed later, this somehow led to another military coup in 1997.  
The northern region districts headquarter of Makeni was the last area of research. This 
region did not experience the large-scale violent conflict until 1998 after the removal 
of the military junta by the Nigerian military forces. Thus, because Makeni had a 
large military barrack and a strategic location linking the main roads to the capital 




• Documentation: It was realized that interviews and questionnaires alone 
would not provide an adequate and independent source of data collection. 
Thus, extra information was sourced from published materials: books, 
journals, newspapers, magazines and the Internet to corroborate the empirical 
findings. I enjoyed the privilege of access to tens of academic materials from 
the University of Tromsø’s library; including an enviable and innumerable 
time on the Internet. However, though it was a great amount of Internet 
sources, some of the theories about weak states and violent conflicts, including 
my case study, were a challenge to grapple with; while others greatly help me 
as well. 
• Direct observation: In this sense, the question was what I wanted to know 
that I should observe. Of course, there were plenty things out there, which 
would have made it impossible to observe everything. But as field notes were 
taken on the sport, there were some physical evidences of lack of socio-
economic services. Without doubt, some had been destroyed by the violent 
conflict but most had been like that prior to the conflict.  In Freetown (capital), 
there was hardly any supply of electricity and clean drinking water for many 
people. In the 2nd city of Bo, about 98 % of the inhabitants use water well as 
their source of clean drinking water; electricity is provided during the rains by 
the hydro plant in Kenema. Kenema inhabitants do enjoy relatively good 
electricity from their hydro dam and a ration supply of pipe borne water in 
addition to the wells.  In Kono, Kailahun, Makeni, the presence of electricity 
and clean drinking water are but a luxury, not accessible to all. The old 
damaged road network before the war linking Freetown and other towns was 
clearly seen.  
• Survey: This referred to a combination of two procedures that were used-
questionnaires and interviews (Kjell & Newton, 2001). In designing the 
questionnaires, I began by piloting them on a small sample of people 
characteristic in the survey. After a rough draft was created, the related key 
theoretical variables contain in the research questions and hypotheses were 
analyzed. Care was taken to ensure that the questions cover every concept and 
there was no duplication or undue treatment of any issue. Terminology was 
 50
important at this point to avoid jargons and simple English was used instead. 
The respondents themselves administered the questionnaire. The latter 
comprised of twenty short answer questions with open-ended responses. Some 
of these questions were dichotomous, meaning they had two possible 
responses like Yes/No, which required the respondent to explain with why or 
how to the respective answer. 
• Interview: It was a semi-structured, which restricted certain kinds of 
communications but allowed spontaneous dialogue in the key issues. This 
helped in several ways depending on the time, space and background of the 
respondent. Each interview was conducted with a fairly open framework, 
allowing a focused dialogue and was audio taped. During these interviews, the 
relevant issues about the conflict were identified, and other interesting issues 
were encountered that would have been followed. Most participants were 
willing to give more information than was bargained for; some of which was 
not worth chasing while a few rewarded my investigation but it was time 
consuming.  
• Focus groups: Initially, most respondents were chosen among the educated 
class but later it became apparent of bias where the uneducated ones, who 
made about 60% of the population, were not targeted.  To make up for this 
bias, an equal focus group interview was held with youths, some of whom 
contacts had been established with before.  
 
3.4 Reflections  
The thought of doing research always carries with it the excitement, inspiration, 
ambition and belief that one is going to make a breakthrough and contribute greatly to 
academia. Not least, being caught up in this euphoria, the field experience revealed a 
different reality to me. Prior this, I had never traveled beyond the capital to the 
provincial regions. The thought of being there the first time was greatly relished; it 
was both work and fun to see new places. There was no experience of any security 
problem since it was my country and the local field assistants were nice. However, 
things took a twist in making arrangements for the interviews and administering of 
questionnaires. It was evident that there is a difference between the perception and 
reality of doing research. 
 51
 
The first problem was that many of the respondents did not return their questionnaire, 
and some who returned it, did not even answer all the questions. The focus group 
interview was very stressful for most of the time.  To say the least, often my 
concentration was scattered and my confidence decreased as one continuously 
received response from all sides. It was more difficult to read the reactions to 
responses the way I could in one-on-one interviews. 
 
My other experience had to do with the question of ethics and independence; the norm 
of research.  My daily concern was to get the cooperation of some participants. This 
common problem and limited cooperation affected some of these research norms. The 
countryside is extremely poor, and for most people, the concern of meeting their daily 
needs was more important than talking to me. Some who knew the purpose of my 
visit asked for money. Often a drink was bought or token given to get their 
participation. Interestingly, since this research was funded by one of world’s richest 
countries, Norway, and as a poor research student in his own country, considered the 
world’s least poor, it was very difficult to ignore some of these ethical concerns. 
  
Ideally, it is also believed that a research has to be independent. However, it is not 
always the case due to situational dynamics. For instance, some of those interviewed 
like ex-combatants and focus groups had different ways of understanding the 
questions. Since the vocabulary was somehow different among us, often attempt was 
made to explain the question, which could have influenced their contributions. Some 
had got a bad experience with other researchers, making it hard to get their 
cooperation. A striking observation was that some of the informers saw themselves as 
reliable sources in the field. It was evident that some of their responses seemed a 
recycling of the same source of information for future researchers, and knowing the 
problem of oral sources, these could lose their authenticity and accuracy. 
 
In the end, it was clear that there was a great difference in behaviour of the various 
warring factions.  It showed a striking consistency of the causes of the violent conflict 
but an inconsistency in the demographic and ethnic profiles of ex-combatants. 
Contrary to common perception, differences among the fighting groups like ethnic, 
regional, religious or political support were small.  Most of them had individual 
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reasons for joining the various factions. To say the least, many were uneducated, poor 
and they had a shared demand for increase access to basic social services like 
education, food, health, clean drinking water, employment and justice.  It was again 
clear that the violent conflict was not openly between the rebels and the state forces. 
Often the rebels and some members of the state forces systemically targeted the 
civilians and there were also violent attacks among civilians who had old disputes 
over land and chieftaincy issues. But in the next chapter we shall see how some of 




 4 Data Presentation and Analysis 
 
In conducting this research, there were a significant number of fewer female 
respondents. Perhaps, the reason for my few female respondents had to do with the 
chores of their family activities. It was also not a deliberate attempt to ignore them.  In 
this analysis, it is clear that it is not a narration about the violent conflict than to 
address how the weak state framework could have ignited it. 
 
4.1 Data presentation 
The data is presented in chart, which is summarized below. The focus group was 
chosen from among the unemployed rural youths. The population of those 
unemployed in S/L is about 65% and thus the aim was to find if there was/is any link 
between unemployment and violence. Since many of them might have suffered the 

















5 5 0 Tertiary Lecturers - PhD/ Masters 
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Kenema/East 5 5 0 Tertiary Chiefs, Lecturer, NGO 
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Bo 10 10 0 Primary Unemployed 
Kono 10 10 0 Primary Unemployed 
Kailahun 10 10 0 Primary Unemployed 
Kenema 10 10 0 Primary Unemployed 
Makeni 10 10 0 Primary Unemployed 












 Age distribution: 
(23-40) 
Freetown 20 19 1 Tertiary Employed 
Bo 12 20 0 Tertiary Employed 
Kono 12 12 0 Tertiary Employed 
Kailahun 12 12 0 Tertiary Employed 
Kenema 12 12 0 Tertiary Employed 
Makeni 12 12 0 Tertiary Employed 
Total 80 79 1   
  
Figure 1: Basic Needs  
  
Fig. 1. My respondents in the questionnaire were asked ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ questions and then explain 
the reason for their choice i.e. ‘How’ or ‘Why’. Question 5 reads: Has the State adequately 
provided essential services like food, water, road, electricity, jobs and security? If yes, how, if no, 
why? The responses make up the variables. 
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No %Undecided  
State Weakness 95 5 0  
Politicized ineffective security institutions 90 5 5  
Legitimacy Crises 87 10 3  
     
Total Percentage 100 100 100  
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Legitimacy Crises 
My aim was to see if there was a logic or connection between weak states and violent 
conflict, which the   respondents were unaware of. Question 8 reads: What do you 
think can happen if the state inadequately fails to provide these basic needs for the 
people? These were the responses I got. 
Responses: Disputes/ Tensions 100 % 
            
Total   
Poverty and low standard of living 23 34   
Anti social activities 10 14   
Discontent 23 34   
Calls for change of government 12 19   
Popular unrest/conflict 21 31   
State anarchy 8 13   
Migration 1 2   
Undecided 2 3   
Total 100 % 150   
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4.2 Weak State Indicators found in data 
This section is basically descriptive. It tries to examine the first part of the research 
question; how the weak state socio-economic and political structures could have 
contributed to the violent conflict. Now the pathology or historical aspect of the weak 
state foundation and process is analyzed in all the key aspects of governance, namely: 
Poor economy, Politicized and Ineffective State Institutions (PISS), Centralization of 
Power, Inadequate provision of Socio-Economic Services, Institutional Incapacity and 
Corruption. From the findings of my data, some of the weak state indicators (Jackson, 
2002; Reno, 1995 and Rotberg, 2004) in the theoretical chapter were confirmed. 
4.2.1 Poor economy 
The economy is my starting point because it is the life-giving unit of any state system. 
S/L, like other African state is richly endowed with natural resources including 
marine, iron ore, diamonds, gold, bauxite, rutile and an environment suitable to grow 
a variety of crops. It was one of Britain’s most lucrative African colonies in the 19th 
century but became the world’s poorest and least developed countries of the 21st century 
(Binns&Binns 1992). And like most of its post-colonial counterparts, the economy 
was basically producing raw materials like agricultural and mineral resources. It was 
heavily dependent on minerals, which accounted for over 5o% and agricultural 
produce about 42% of total export (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:2, Dunn, 1978: 193-195). 
However, the diamond boom before independence saw a massive influx of young 
men who left their agricultural activities in search of quick fortune from the diamond 
mines. This affected the local food production, which led to importation of large 
volumes of its staple food-rice and other cash crops: coffee, cocoa, palm oil was also 
affected thereby reducing the state’s revenue (Dunn, 1978:195). The effect by this 
huge diversion of labour had to do with the system of corruption and informal 
economy, as the institutions were not strong or effective to ensure a level playing field 
to allocate the resources of the state.  
The limited means of raising revenues did not dampen the APC’s resolve to find 
alternatives. It adopted other means to pay more for local food production of rice to 
eliminate rice importation but the effect was a huge loss in foreign exchange. In 
addition, the government embarked on massive infrastructural constructions but had 
no capital to finish them. It resorted to external borrowing thereby increasing its 
foreign debts (Dunn, 1978:195). Still, the economy was hit by the rapid decline of 
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world market prices for agricultural cash crops, and being heavily dependent on a 
wide variety of imports, it meant a continual loss of foreign exchange and an 
unfavourable trade balance. However, it did not mean that the reason for the poor 
economy should be levelled squarely at international forces. This had to do with the 
state’s political system of patrimony and corruption. For instance, the marine 
resources dominated by the powerful ally of President Stevens, an Afro-Lebanese 
businessman, Jamil Sahid Mohammed was smuggling millions of dollars worth of 
marine products abroad; thus under the watchful eye of the state he was evading 
government tariffs (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:13, Dunn 1978:196, Meredith, 2005:562). It 
was serious for a country rich in natural resources to be broke. It showed what we 
have been saying of how weak states are run. When President Stevens retired in 1985, 
he had amassed a huge fortune of about $500 million and left the country weak and 
broke (Meredith, 2005:562). As we will later discuss, it reflected a state with general 
political incompetence; it was unable to organize its material and human resources, 
mobilize its citizens, implement policies for societal growth, and there was politicized 
pattern of social differentiation, inevitably eroding its legitimacy (Ayoob, 1995:11). 
In other words, the government was unable to effectively and prudently use the state 
resources, which were controlled by the elite and benefactors.  
• Financial mismanagement and impacts of foreign aid conditions  
Most weak states are unable to sustain themselves financially and since they cannot 
generate enough revenues, they are heavily dependent on foreign aid to fill the gap 
and S/L was no exception. When the economy was about to decline in the late 70s, 
foreign aid flooded the country. Sad to say, the situation was worsened by the failed 
fiscal policy and corrupt leadership.  For instance, the international monetary fund 
(IMF) loaned the government about $50million, which was wasted on hosting the 
OAU Summit (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:14). The aid conditions imposed by international 
financial institutions (IFIs) on developing nations in the early 1980s had an adverse 
effect on the state’s capacity to perform21.  In 1984, the IMF initiated its structural 
adjustment programmes, including ‘the repayment of previous loans, devaluation of 
the currency and removal of subsidies on fuel and rice’ (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:14). 
Since the government had seen the effects of aid conditions in other countries, it was 
unwilling to accept such conditions. Thus, the IMF stopped its negotiations and the 
                                               
21 Interviews (Freetown, June-July 2007) See also: Magbaily Fyle 1993:14-15, 
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one year standby agreement it had with the government. The government became 
handicapped as it had a huge loan it had not withdrawn from the IMF. The rule was 
that other IFIs could not work with a defaulting state (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:14). The 
APC had to accept the IMF conditions and it devalued the Leones over the dollar, 
removed subsidies on fuel and rice, and cut back about 50,000 workers in key sectors; 
the effect was an astronomical increase in prices22. 
 
The heavy dependence on foreign aid and the conditions of the International Financial 
Institutions became the straw that broke the camel’s back. No doubt, it marked the 
beginning of turbulent years ahead, as one respondent states, “if democracy is linked 
with the development of a country, then one could say that there was a discrepancy 
between the IMF aid and the conditions imposed on the state, which heavily depended 
on the IFI for revenue, when it had huge lapses in its economy and an inadequate 
social delivery service”23. Like many respondents, he had a different opinion about 
the state’s heavy reliance on foreign aid. Some even argued that simply if a state 
receives foreign aid does not transfer to it being weak, because a good number of 
countries, for e.g. Israel, Egypt receive aid and are considered strong states. Another 
concludes; “the downturn in socio-economic development and in livelihoods was 
visible as most people were unemployed. Many became anti-system and unsupportive 
to a government they saw as not working in their interests. The state’s inability to 
deliver the basic political goods made people feel deprive and the existing structural 
violence made people helpless”24. The structural violence was equated with indirect 
violence, which refers to the inequality that emanated from the social structure itself 
between the various classes of people in the community. But as we discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, these aid conditions had a negative effect of igniting mass 
violence; we shall look at this later. 
 
4.2.2 Politicized and Ineffective State Institutions (PISS) 
In weak states, the institutions responsible for national security are politicized; 
recruitment and promotion are done on the basis of ethnic loyalty (Magbaily Fyle, 
                                               
22 Interview, Freetown June 2007;Questionnaire  
23 Dr Kargbo, Professor of Political Science, Njala University College, University of S/L.  
24 J.A.D Alie- Professor of History, Fourah Bay College, University of S/L Interviews, Freetown, June 
2007 
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1993:5). The bedrock of realism in international relations is a state’s ability to protect 
its citizens and territory against internal and external armed attacks or violence of any 
kind. This was not the case in S/L, where ‘the politicization of the military started 
when the SLPP instigated it to overthrow the APC from being sworn into power after 
losing the 1967 general elections’ (Ero, 2003:239). This early machination laid the 
foundation for the military’s involvement in politics. After the APC leader, Siaka 
Stevens, was reinstated by another coup in 1968, he never trusted the military. 
Stevens started what Migdal calls the ‘politics of survival’ (Migdal, 1988:227-229). 
To ensure his own safety, he established two loyal paramilitary units within the police 
force; namely the Internal Security Unit and the Special Security Division (Ero, 
2003:235; Magbaily Fyle, 1993:6). The recruits were mainly from the APC 
stronghold, acting as private security to terrorize and use violence against political 
opponents and citizens in general elections and demonstrations25. The unflinching 
loyalty of these units made people to derogatorily term them, ‘I Shoot You’ (ISU) and 
‘Siaka Steven Dogs’ (SSD). Stevens also promoted both members of his own Limba 
ethnic group as head of the army and police; he also made them members of 
parliament. His successor, President Momoh continued this process of recruitment 
and promotion. Recruitment was commercialized; each leading politician and the 
military top brass were allocated a share, which was sold or given to people closely 
connected with them.   
The army and police were provided with huge subsidies, loans to build houses, lower 
rice price and a fair monthly rice quota to the senior personnel. One military 
personnel says¸“the government was afraid to provide us with the necessary and 
adequate logistics for fear of being overthrown” 26(also Magbaily Fyle, 1993:5). This 
made the military a gold mine for the senior personnel and the politically connected, 
enriching themselves at other ranks expense. The effect was a military whose loyalty 
was to these officials and the recruitment of a good number of ill disciplined, ill 
equipped, divided and poorly trained. This created the security dilemma and cracks 
the RUF was soon to expose.  
 
                                               
25 Questionnaires, Interviews, June-July 2007; Magbaily Fyle, 1993:5; Ero, 2003:225. 
26 Interview, June 2007, Kenema military headquarter 
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4.2.3 Centralization of power 
The centralization of power in the hand of a ruling elite or a single party is another 
indicator of weak state with significant ramifications in its governance and economic 
development.  In S/L, the centralization of power was a colonial legacy and it 
continued even after independence. The effect was gradual decline in effective 
engagement with the people; as one respondent says, “this over centralization of state 
machinery removed the government far from its people to the point that people see 
government institutions as exclusive of their daily lives”27. One chief also says, “when 
it came to decision-making or consultation, the state machinery functioned from top-
down and not from bottom-up. The state did what it wanted without our people’s 
consent; irrespective of whether they supported a policy or not”. In the rural areas, 
local functionaries were appointed by the central government, which meant that 
people had to be members of the APC or connected with those in authority before 
they could get the job. The system of local government was so flawed that there was 
no election to elect district and provincial leaders. There was only one central radio 
station situated in the capital responsible for news broadcast, which could have been 
used for both propaganda and limited information. Since some key institutions were 
far removed from the main regional centers, workers had to move to Freetown to get 
things done. According to King, scarcity of services like good roads and electricity 
were not too important for the conflict (King, 2007:19). This was an interesting 
finding; however, an ex-RUF chief in Kailahun says one reason the APC was hated 
because of the bad road network. As we see next, the concentration of power in weak 
states could affect the provision of socio-economic services, which for the most part 
are insufficient, limited or unaffordable. 
 
4.2.4 Inadequate provision of socio-economic services   
During the fieldwork, the horrible extent of how the state’s incompetence affected the 
entire country was seen. For instance, there were scanty provision of essential services 
like health, clean drinking water and electricity in places like Makeni, Bo, Kenema, 
Kono and Kailahun where people only had access to clean drinking water during the 
rains.  In the dry season, there was and is no water supply except dug out wells; some 
                                               
27 Interview June 2007, Kono, Gbondo, Director for Foundation for Environmental Security and 
Sustainability  
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untreated, which exposed people to many hazards28.  The dynamics of resentment was 
different in each province. In Kenema, respondents say they had to run behind 
vehicles for food as everything was rationed. They had to queue for several days or in 
some cases have links with the resident minister just to get a dozen cup of rice, a 
gallon of petrol, kerosene, which was unbearable29. In Kailahun, one of the chiefs 
installed by the RUF says they were angry with the APC since most of them are 
farmers, they suffered huge loss of revenue as they were unable to have vehicles to 
transport their goods on time; most of which perished as there was no effective 
storage facility. The roads became worse in the rainy season, making it impossible for 
trucks to move in and transport their produce. It was during such moment that Foday 
Sankoh appeared and said that the APC had failed them30. Since Kailahun is a 
traditional stronghold of the opposition SLPP party, another chief says, “Sankoh 
compared what life was like under the SLPP leadership of both Margai brothers, Sir 
Milton and Sir Albert Margai respectively. Thus, some people began to take note and 
buy his ideas; they were willing to listen to whosoever could take the risk of removing 
the government”31. In Makeni, resentment against the APC was not too wide. It was 
clear of the APC’s incapacity to provide the basic needs; services like electricity and 
water supply were provided to those in authority and people queuing to purchase their 
essential food items.  It was stunning when many said that they were economically 
viable during the economic malaise, since they are farmers they were able to supply 
and afford their needs. One could easily surmise since this was the APC’s stronghold, 
they could not be that discontent; however, another respondent says, “popular 
resentment against the APC was not regional but national”32.  
 
Kono was known to be one of the wealthiest places in the country, providing about 
70% of the revenue33, yet underdeveloped. During the fieldwork, it was evident that 
the state of the infrastructure was bad; no good roads. One school principal says, there 
                                               
28 Interviews June-July 2007 
29 Questionnaires, Interviews June-July 2007.  These primary data were useful as some truly reflect the 
situation. 
30 Interview, June 2007,Freetown, Dr Abdullah, Professor of History at University of S/L and the 
author of  ‘RUF’s bush path to destruction’. 
31 Interview, June 2007 with Chief Gbenya in Kenema 
32 Mr Augustine Conteh, teacher, Interview, July 2007, Makeni. 
33 Government of S/L, Ministry of Finance, The 1975/76 Budget Speech, Freetown, Government 
Printing Department, 1975. 
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were five main secondary schools for over 150, 000 inhabitants. There was only one 
small dam that was responsible for supplying water during the rainy seasons.  
The local resentment had to do with the economy being controlled by President 
Stevens and the ethnic Lebanese minority. A brief note of the country’s cultural 
profile is useful here to understand how this Lebanese economic hegemony was laid 
and the grievance it spawned. S/L is multi-cultural; about 80% are indigenous 
Africans; the 20% comprised Asian descendants from Lebanon, Pakistan, Indian and 
Sri Lankan. About 60% of this population are Sunni Muslims; 30% Christians, few 
practice indigenous religions and the rest are Shiite of Lebanese descent (Farah, 
2004:23), which became a haven for Middle East Islamic extremist groups during the 
early 80s (this is discussed later). The Lebanese minority became influential due to 
their strong link with President Stevens’ key economic advisor, a Lebanese 
businessman, Jamil Mohamed. Together they shared control of the diamond mines 
and owned sixty percent of the business (Meredith, 2005:564). Stevens even favoured 
this Lebanese minority with mining licenses and discriminated against the Kono 
locals. Thus, one Kono chief says, “when people saw this, they became not only 
frustrated but sought whatever ways of removing the government”34.  
However, there is an interesting note to add here that seems amiss. One is uncertain 
whether the frustration expressed had anything to do with the prejudice that existed 
(as it still does), between the Lebanese community and the indigenous population or 
the social mores of the former. Lebanese men can marry or date the indigenous 
women without any stricture; however, the Lebanese women are not allowed to do the 
same with the indigenous men, regardless of status (education or wealth). Even it 
happened; the community will disown the women. One could somehow say that the 
frustration expressed was and is about the resources of the Lebanese. Marriage is one 
medium of resources sharing in Africa, especially Sierra Leone and the prohibition of 
such marriages is the denial of sharing these resources. In a way, intermarriage could 
be equated to social capital (Coleman, 1988; 1994) thus, it is possible that if inter 
marriage is allowed in both ways, may be the simmering resentment would blow out.  
One also learnt that 80% of the population are engaged in mining activities and when 
asked why, the reason they gave fell back at the state’s feet; that there were limited 
economic or educational opportunities to involve in.  
                                               
34 Interview, June 2007, section Chief in Kono 
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Education was mostly provided at a limited scale in the urban areas, but in the rural 
areas, it was not prioritized and thus, the widespread level of illiteracy affected 
people’s ability to make effective judgment about the government’s activities. 
However, another respondent said that “those who were able to succeed in attaining 
education in the urban areas did so out of their own personal drive than the help of the 
state”35. It was common for people to work without salaries; especially teachers 
would go to school and harass the pupils to give them money. It was difficult for the 
government to have employed more people when it could not pay its workers.  
Health facilities were also in stint supply and so appalling that patients had to provide 
their own bedding and food in the government hospitals. In the Freetown central 
hospital, doctors had to provide their own power supply before a surgery; drugs were 
scarce and expensive. The situation was so rife that some patients ran away from the 
hospital in preference for self medication. 
 
4.2.5 Institutional Incapacity 
As postulated, various levels of instititutional incapacity and regular inability to 
implement policies characterize weak states (Byman& Van Evera, 1998:37).  In S/L, 
the effect of these was the accretion of political grievances, where the state 
institutions became incapable at a minimal level to operate (Jackson, 2002:39) 
because the institutions responsible for good governance were paralysed. President 
Stevens was adept at weakening the state’s most important institutions for good 
governance: the parliament, the judiciary, the civil service and an independent press 
(Ero, 2003; Magbaily Fyle, 1993; Bangura, 1997). In most states, it is imperative that 
an independent judiciary could ensure the rule of law. In S/L, the judiciary was both 
corrupt and ineffective where many people; especially the poor could not enjoy their 
basic human rights. One section chief in Tiama says, “the system was so handicapped 
that it took a long time to settle disputes; many others were never settled. Some land 
disputes between chiefdoms were never addressed by the state. For instance, in old 
boundary disputes between villages and chiefdoms, there were decisions taken that 
did not go down well with the chiefdom concerned.  In some chiefdoms, powerful 
chiefs meted out injustice against other rival political families; it was common for 
people to lose a local dispute as well as the lands they owned for many generations”. 
                                               
35 Din Gabisi, Electoral Officer, Bombali District, Interview, July 2007, Makeni 
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For example, one ex-combatant in Kailahun told me that there were hardly any 
protections of their basic human rights. He said that as a boy he heard from his many 
relatives, who complained of injustices and said if things continued as it were, civil 
violence was inevitable. Another said most of his relatives were poor farmers, who 
were not paid well by the Lebanese and local merchants for their produce. Often they 
needed permit to see their debtors before they could get paid. The money was 
received in bits; a loss of revenue that made it hard to expand their business. Some 
said that they were faced with a situation where the court and the police could not 
help; they wanted to oppose but were brutally suppressed, and thus, the opposition 
went underground, which exactly happened with the RUF. The APC made things 
worse when some people were detained for several weeks or months without trial and 
during elections any attempt to oppose the government was met with reprisal36. 
 
A weak state cannot guarantee the rule of law; it was the privilege of the powers-that-
be to get away with some things done against the poor or those without influence.  
The APC government created the situation where people took the law into their hands 
to redress injustice. When the RUF first initiated its brutal attacks in Kailahun, it said 
it had come to liberate the country from years of nepotism, violence and political 
exclusion (Ero, 2003:237). The latter was somehow grounded in the post-colonial 
framework (Atiku-Abubakarr&Shaw-Taylor, 2000:71), where political power became 
a secured path to wealth. The impact of this disequilibrium was great; many people 
were unable to share the wealth of the resources; instead they were marginalized from 
economic opportunities and social welfare services (Ero, 2003:234). It follows that a 
weak state is not only about the inadequate provision of basic needs but creating the 
conditions where those felt marginalized are more likely to resort to violent means to 
survive. The marginalization of the urban and rural poor youths forced many to seek 
gains from the diamond mines; others acted as armed gangs or provided private 
protection to those involved in business (Ero, 2003:234). The evidence of poor 
conditions, youth marginalization, violence and the use of child combatants are 
addressed later. 
 
                                               
36 Questionnaires, Interviews; June-July 2007 
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4.2.6 Corruption  
Another confirming indicator of weak state was corruption. From the questionnaires, 
almost 90% of respondents said corruption was a key problem of governance. But 
why was it so? A summary of S/L society could give us an insight about the reason 
behind this corruption. The society is based on strong extended family relationships, 
where existing social codes require successful members to help family and friends. 
The Krio society centres on nuclear family, based on personal endeavour and success, 
and there is no obligation to one’s relatives (Thompson & Potter, 1997:140). The 
norm for success to political, public service is that one’s status is measured by 
affluence. Those who did not own an expensive car or house were hardly respected by 
relatives or others. It was significant that the indigenous groups, whose social network 
is based on strong external family relationship, came to dominate politics after 
independence. Many had to be accommodated by the government to create new areas 
of wealth and institutions with great potential for siphoning state resources within the 
public service.  
Thus, it could be argued that the pervasive corruption was rooted in this extended 
family relationship, because many public officials by norm had to help their extended 
family members with resources. The custom among this extended family system of 
the provincial people is that often members contribute to educate other children. 
Those ones, who were able to finish university and get a good job, had to return the 
investment in other family members. The income received was too small to cater for 
the needs of immediate and extended families.  
As Jackson says, ‘corruption in weak state politics are not simply the result of a 
breakdown in normal politics... but can be construed as class action necessitated by 
the fragility of the material conditions of the ruling elites’ (2002:43). The burden of 
these state officials, who were also family members, was too much, that corruption 
was seen as an alternative source to meet these commitments. Ironically, it was 
majority of the indigenous poor classes, who suffered the effect of corruption, as not 
every family had a member within the informal network. 
President Steven’s patronage system ensured that only the political elite were given 
access to the nation’s wealth. It was a strategy used for political support, co-option or 
repression (Dunn, 1978:198). Riley’s four classifications of corruption: incidental, 
systematic, systemic and personal (1993) could be applied here. Incidental corruption 
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was shown by public servants, who in the course of duty had to seek a bribe or favour; 
systematic corruption was orchestrated by government departments, involving in 
fraud and embezzling state resources; systemic corruption typified the pervasive 
pathology of wrong doing as a norm to achieve personal objectives (Caiden & Caiden, 
1977). 
As Stevens justified corruption, he gave a Krio proverb, whose English translation 
reads thus, “where a cow is tied is where it should graze”. In other words, it was a 
necessity for all public servants to make the best use of every given opportunity, as 
lost opportunity would not be regained (Thompson& Potter, 1997: 151). One Kono 
chief strongly says, “whatever was in the state coffers they shared among themselves 
and displeased the people”37. None was more obvious, as mentioned earlier, than the 
minority of the local and Lebanese business people, who were involved in many 
economic activities like transport, diamond and rice import (Dunn, 1978:198).  In 
order to protect their business, they made extensive bribes to governmental officials, 
including the police, chiefs and judicial personnel, making it difficult to bring any 
case against them38. Government contracts were awarded to the lowest bidders for 
kick backs or commissions. One respondent said that “under President Momoh’s rule, 
the government was not only performing badly, that there was hardly anything done 
to curb, limit, or remove corruption”39. Others said that the country had two laws: one 
for the rich and poor respectively. As the judiciary became politicized, it was weak in 
prosecuting corrupt officials. Corruption became endemic, which spawned the worm 
of hatred for the elites by the urban and rural poor.  
Summarizing this section, the data has confirmed the weak state indicators. We now 
analyzed how the effect of this weakness on the society. 
 
4.3 Section 2: Data analysis – State Weakness as a Catalyst to Legitimacy Crises         
and Escalation of the Violent Conflict 
In this section, the 2nd part of the research question will be analysed; i.e., why the state 
weakness contributed to the violence escalation. It was indicated in Chapters 2&3 that 
the analytic method will be process tracing because it ‘is convincing insofar as the 
multiple links in a causal chain can be formalized, that is, diagrammed in an explicit 
                                               
37 Interview, Section Chief in Kono ,June 2007 
38 Interview, July 2007, Freetown; see Dunn, 1978 
39 Interview, July 2007, Din Gabisi, Electoral officer for Bombali district 
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way (as a visual depiction and / or mathematical model), and insofar as each micro-
mechanism can be proven’ (Gerring, 2007:181). Since this is a qualitative study and if 
the causal relationship can be described in prose, then it ought to be explained with a 
diagram (Geering, 2007:181).  
 
Figure 1 
Weak State/Basic Needs Violent Conflict
Legitimacy  Crises Disputes/Tensions 
 
Thus, this process tracing is used with the conceptual model to explain the mutual 
links of state weakness and violent conflict. Using the model, the state weakness led 
to several legitimacy crises; the people lost confidence and support of the 
government. As illustrated in this conceptual model, the government’s legitimacy 
crises had a rebound effect of further weakening the state. One definitive aspect of 
weak states is the lack of good governance and problems of legitimacy. If democracy 
is understood as a means to achieve transparent, accountable and legitimate 
government, where is it the majority of the citizens who have chosen it in free and fair 
elections (i.e. the will of the people), then the key potential cause of violent conflict 
lies in the centralization of power and political exclusion (Jackson, 2002:47).  The 
latter was the case in S/L and some of my data confirmed what many scholars say are 
factors of legitimacy crises in weak state. It will be analysed in two phases: a) pre 
1990 and b) post 1990. The reason I choose these periods is for us to understand the 
process behind the weak state foundation and the consequences of its consolidation. 
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We have touched on them briefly in the previous section and though it may seem a 
repetition, the key theme under each period will be discussed.  
 
4.3.1 Legitimacy crises: 1967-1990 
Legitimacy has to do with citizens’ support as one of the basis of a government to 
rule, why it should be obeyed and under what condition it can claim authority. In S/L, 
the political history soon after independence saw the initiation of undemocratic 
politics by the first post-colonial government of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
(SLPP). It started with including traditional rulers in the undemocratic process to 
consolidate political support in the interior as we now see. 
 
• Machinations of local chieftaincy and national politics 
Chieftaincy has been the cornerstone of local interior politics of Sierra Leone even 
before colonial rule, and has continued even after colonialism. It is so important that it 
is enshrined in the constitutional provisions of 1991. Chiefs are the foundation of 
power in the rural areas where the visible presence of the central government is 
absent. The political support of traditional rulers in S/L has been very crucial to any 
government, thus, they have always been included in the central government’s 
politics.   
The independence constitution of 1961 ensured multi-party elections after every five 
years. In 1962, the SLPP Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, initiated exclusionary 
policies assisted by the chiefs. Although the 1962 Electoral Act had restricted the 
chiefs from involving in any election campaigns, they supported the SLPP; they 
banned other candidates from contesting in their chiefdoms and charged many with 
incitement for undermining their authority (Dunn, 1978:200-1). In compensation, the 
SLPP did not question these chiefs traditional authority and provided them with 
financial rewards. This resulted in a tense competition in chieftaincy politics as well 
as a bitter resentment for chiefs, who abused their power against rivals. The chiefs had 
power over the control of lands used for diamond mining and farming, and those not 
in their good books were left out of the informal economy (Reno, 1995). Hence, it 
was obvious that chiefs whose power was under threat looked to the SLPP for 
support, while their rivals joined the opposition parties hoping their victory in a 
general election would mean their own political ascendancy (Dunn, 1978:201). 
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The effect was a divided nation and a government whose legitimacy was greatly 
weakened. In the general election of 1967, the opposition All Peoples Congress 
(APC) party defeated the SLPP; the first in postcolonial Africa where the opposition 
democratically removed a ruling government. But the transition process took a nose 
dive as the sordid political shenanigans of power struggle arose among the country’s 
leading ethnic groups.  The military chief of staff said he stepped in on the grounds of 
irregularities and the imminence of ethnic conflict; he arrested and later sent the 
opposition leader to exile. Significantly, his action had a smoking gun; he was an in-
law to the Prime Minister and being a Mende from the southeastern part of the 
country, was seen as a mask to keep the SLPP in power; and as Ero says, the SLPP 
instigated the military to stage a coup, preventing the APC from taking office (Ero, 
2003:239); officers from the western and northern part of the country also removed 
him the same year.  
 
When the APC opposition leader, Siaka Stevens was reinstated a year later by another 
coup as Prime Minister, he initiated a series of legal manipulation that saw the 
removal of the SLPP’s twenty-three MPs. The APC supporters who had experienced 
the repression of these chiefs began to invoke hostility against them and all the chiefs 
supporting the SLPP were replaced with party stalwarts. This strengthened his 
informal economy even in the rural areas, which created the situation for political 
grievances among those who could not have access to the lands for either diamond or 
agricultural purposes. As some respondents note, Stevens also orchestrated a series of 
widespread violence against the SLPP supporters in successive elections.40 There was 
an ominous situation for the government when another political party emerged from 
the north, which the APC considered its bastion. This new political party, the United 
Democratic Party, was established by former APC members, who were the most 
outspoken critics belonging to the Temne; the country’s 2nd largest ethnic group. 
Predictably, in 1970, Stevens was quick to ban this party from participating in the 
next electoral process (Dunn, 1978:202). 
 
                                               
40 This was the interview with Dr Alie (Freetown) and Mbayo (Kenema), both of whom are lecturers. 
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In the elections of 1973 and 1977, there were numerous incidents where the SLPP 
candidates were brutally prevented from entering the nomination centers to verify 
their candidacy as required by law. At the end of the elections, half of the 85 
constituencies saw the APC’s candidates elected unopposed and the SLPP candidates 
had to withdraw (Dunn, 1978:202). As some respondents said, this thuggery and 
intimidation was followed by arrest and detention of the opposition under the Public 
Emergency Act of 1977. These blatant acts and electoral violence made the APC to 
lose whatever little support it had in the south-eastern parts of the country; the 
opposition SLPP stronghold. In 1978, the APC introduced a Republican Constitution, 
which outlawed multi party elections and changed the office of the Prime Minister to 
that of a President. The constitution required all MPs to join the APC or face 
expulsion from parliament. One key provision ruled that only members of the APC 
could have the right to contest for the presidency or nominate a candidate in a national 
delegate conference. Ironically, the eleven opposition SLPP MPs agreed, meaning it 
was expedient for their political survival than the principles of good governance. This 
act removed and destroyed any chance of free and fair democratic process in S/L; a 
process that further weakened the government’s legitimacy. 
 
The constitution gave the President more power to appoint and dismiss the Electoral 
Commission on the grounds of inability to discharge its responsibility or 
misbehaviour, meaning that the members were only responsible to him. Inevitably, 
the Commission became biased since it employed party stalwarts; the opposition was 
deprived of registering its candidates in areas the APC had no support. In other parts, 
the APC’s own candidates were elected unopposed; in other areas, the SLPP and 
independent candidates were allowed to register but the government would send thugs 
to disrupt the polling. One eye witness said that those who did not have a red clothes; 
the APC symbol, were never allowed near the polling booth and that in the one party 
referendum of 1978, in Kono West constituency, only one voter was allowed to pour 
all ballot items in the box41.  
As illustrated on the conceptual model diagram, the legitimacy crises of a government 
could lead to disputes and tensions. This was borne out by the many challenges 
against the APC’s illegal and forceful possession of power. 
                                               
41 Interview, June 2007, Kenema, Lecturer 
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• Disputes and Tensions 
Although the APC had sponsored violence in many elections, the one of 1982 was 
striking because there was more exclusion, violence, rigging, and hostility among 
some ethnic groups. Having turned the country to a one party state, the APC central 
committee was responsible to approve those who should run for election. Many of 
those who were distrusted or unpopular in the central committee were not allowed to 
contest or their supporters were prevented from voting.  The outcome was a wave of 
violence across many parts of the country. For instance, in the northern district of 
Bombali, violence occurred between the supporters of two local politicians; mainly 
the Fullah and Temne ethnic groups, contesting for the parliamentary seat within the 
APC. Also, in the southern district of Pujehun, violence broke out between the 
supporters of two local politicians of the Mende ethnic group. Ironically, some people 
in this district started a guerrilla movement to resist what they saw was the APC’s 
heavy handedness and use of state sponsored violence, though, it was brutally 
suppressed. In Moyamba district, the local APC politician, Harry Will, unleashed 
violence against his opponents and in the western area, the thuggery in one of the 
constituencies, West One, led to a cancellation of the election42. There was a wide 
practice of drug using youths prepared to engage in the thuggery and violence of the 
election. These youths who were manipulated by these politicians foreshadowed the 
atrocious activities of youths that later emerged during the violent conflict of 1991 to 
2001. 
 
The thinning of political participation did not stop when President Stevens transferred 
power to General J.S Momoh in 1985. Instead, it revealed the can of worms found in 
the broader political process, where within the party’s hierarchy, dubious legal means 
were adopted to prevent the 1st VP from succeeding Stevens (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:11; 
Zack Williams, 1999:145). The national delegate of the party nominated Momoh and 
sworn him as the new President. This was not a surprise to many who, however, saw 
Momoh’s reign as a continuation of Steven’s rule where flawed political participation 
was twisted under the guise of legitimacy familiar with dictators. In 1987, there was a 
failed coup attempt against President Momoh and all the accused were tried and 
sentenced to death. It was a continuation of the ethnic crisis since most of the accused 
                                               
42 Interview June-July 2007 
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belonged to the Mende ethnic group, and the 1st accused was President Momoh’ 1st 
VP, who happened to be one. Thus, it was seen by many people from the southeast as 
a conspiracy to exterminate their leading political figure. Under Momoh’s 
government, there was a coterie of the President’s ethnic Limba group and few 
politicians from the other ethnic groups, which came to dominate the activities of 
governance and finance. Unlike Stevens, there was no kind of local election during 
Momoh’s reign, thereby continuing the political exclusion of many people.  
To reiterate, the above process tracing analysis confirmed the conceptual model of a 
weak state being weakened further and worsening its legitimacy crises. The rebound 
or boomerang effect was the outbreak of violent conflict. 
 
4.3.2 The Violent Conflict 1991-1998 
The end of the 80s saw a state that was inadequately providing its people’s basic needs. 
The population became hopeless, blaming the government for their troubles and were 
ready as Fyle said, ‘to jump onto the streets to express their frustration’ (1993: 5-11), 
and this started gradually. The end of the cold war in the 90s sent a clear signal from 
Washington that democracy should be the new political lexicon for all authoritarian 
Africa governments. It started when the British High Commissioner for S/L, Derek 
Partridge, gave a keynote speech at a conference held by the Bar Association, 1990, 
criticizing the one party government in the constitution and called for a multi party 
democracy.43 The Bar Association and the National Students Unions stepped up the 
pressure and the government finally caved in by deciding to have a national 
consultative conference, where they arranged that elections be held in 1991. Ironically, 
it was never held as the first open sign of violent conflict began against the APC in 
1991 with the RUF. The outbreak of the violent conflict fascinatingly revealed the 
reality of weak states that people are liable to resolve their grievances without recourse 
to the state. The poor provision of social services created the general economic 
desperation and conditions for an organized armed opposition. The RUF 
controversially justified on its pamphlet that the violent conflict was ‘about the 
problems of social fragmentation, the exclusion of youths and the exploitation of 
diamonds’44. The first attacks in Kailahun targeted the existing state structures and 
                                               
43 Interview, June 2007,FBC; Magbaily Fyle,1993:9 
44 Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone, 1995,www.sierra-
Leone.org/footpaths.html 
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individuals associated with it; captured and beheaded chiefs, village heads and other 
government workers (Meredith, 2005:563).  
 
Initially, the RUF had a few rebels but later recruited many locals due to several 
factors. To start with, though the RUF initiated brutal attacks- burnt down houses, 
raped and killed people in sight, some took up arms, especially the young, to settle old 
scores of political and economic grievances. You had a situation where some young 
people were ostracized from their society long before the war. Some of them had 
problems with traditional rulers and the punishment meted against them was so serious 
that many were forced to leave their villages. So when they joined the RUF and went 
back to their villages they used all sort of violence against these traditional rulers. In 
Kailahun, some respondents said that they joined to protect themselves and their 
relatives as the RUF easily bullied people or took their wives from them. It was usually 
said that ‘civilians had no blood’, in other words they were not important45.  
 
However, the question raised was if the reason for the violent conflict had to do with 
the lack of their basic needs, why many people not associated with politics were 
targeted. Interestingly, the answer was that it happened, within the same family, two 
brothers; an elder and younger, joined together to make a cocoa farm. After the 
younger brother’s death, the elder was supposed to be responsible for the welfare of his 
family. But it happened that the elder brother neglected the deceased brother’s family, 
leaving them to suffer. Thus, when the RUF came many of the children of the dead 
brother took up arms in search of their uncle, killed him and destroyed his house. On 
the other hand, his own family would also hunt, kill and burn down the house of the 
perpetrators46. In short, this was how conflict developed, which indicates the general 
points I have been making about state weakness. The general situation of want 
becomes extremely important that the poor provisions of socio-economic services by 
the state torn family members apart. There was no effective legal recourse to address 
disputes nor was the state in place to help these family feuds. This was how or why the 
level of violence escalated within these towns and villages, where people were targeted 
due to family feuds. 
                                               
45 Interview; Section Chief, June 2007, Kailahun, 
46 Interview; ex-RUF communications officer and military planner, June 2007,Kailahun, 
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4.3.3 Politicized Security Institutions (PSI) 
The effects of politicized state institutions like the security could be devastating in 
weak states, especially in the wake of violent conflicts. The security apparatus; 
especially the military, was used as an institution to protect the ruling government.  The 
establishment was structured to maintain the APC in power to the point that civil 
control of the military was non-existent since the government was not willing to probe 
into their activities for fear of being overthrown. Thus, to keep the military in its 
barracks, the APC created a kind of huge wall shielded from the prying public eyes.  It 
was a strategy of containment or safety pin against the military’s trigger of coups 
frequent in Africa.  Ironically, as the military was insulated against control, it became a 
problem the state failed to address. The military became ill trained and ill equipped to 
fight; since what was meant to maintain a professional army was shared by the top 
brass. One of the respondents says that the APC gave more preference to a particular 
group than others as the top brass in the military and the police. Though the respondent 
did not mention the group, it was evident that he was referring to the northern ethnic 
groups, which was the APC’s stronghold. 
 
The size of the security force was another problem; as a section chief said, “it was 
important to note that the number of the security force was very small. In a population 
of about 4 million then, the police force numbered 6000”. There are 12 districts, 
including Freetown, meaning every district had about 500 personnel. He says that 
where each district had over 16 chiefdoms it was hard to deploy them evenly. The 
military was less than 5000 before the RUF attacked the country47 and they were 
sparsely deployed countrywide. During my fieldwork in Kailahun, which borders 
Guinea and Liberia, with over fifty six crossing points there are just five points that 
have border guards. One of the guards says that even before 1991 most of these 
crossing points were unmanned, which explained a state security that was dangerously 
thin. 
 
Thus, the APC was bitten by its own serpent of state weakness, and given the poor 
condition of the roads, the military was unable to effectively supply the little logistics 
to the fronts and it suffered many setbacks in the initial RUF attacks: deaths, wounded, 
                                               
47 Mr Gbenya is the section chief of Taima in the southern district of Bo. 
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captives and defectors. In its attempt to contain the RUF, the APC increased its limited 
military size (Meredith, 2005:564). The problem was not the number per se rather than 
providing them with the necessary logistics and salaries, which unfortunately the 
government could not afford. It was reported that the APC spent $ 2.4 million daily on 
the war (Magbaily Fyle, 1993:11); however, the senior army personnel siphoned 
whatever logistics was sent to the soldiers at the front. For instance, the salaries of 
junior personnel were not paid and their commanders without justification embezzled 
their rice supplies. Inevitably, on April 29, 1992, some of these personnel, whose 
previous intention was to protest the conditions at the war front, stormed Freetown and 
removed the APC without a fight, calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC). The regime received international and internal legitimacy, especially among 
the youths. It could be hard to make a claim of ethnicity; however, it was evident that 
the coup was orchestrated by personnel from the southeast (i.e. the SLPP’s stronghold), 
who were loyal to the SLPP (Jorgel &Utas, 2008:8). The NPRC’s average age was 26 
years, many of who had grown under the 24 years of APC’s bad governance and 
economic decline. 
 
The NPRC inherited a few personnel, which forced it to massively increase the 
military’s size to 14, 000, including young men with criminal records (Meredith, 
2005:564). However, the political dynamic was that the NPRC had overthrown the 
APC, which had been in power for over 22 years.  Most of the army’s top brass 
commanding the troops at the fronts were a product of the APC48. Significantly, as 
these officers did everything possible to frustrate the activities of the NPRC, the fight 
against the RUF became a massive business of corruption to make wealth.  It became 
complicated when after the NPRC coup, two different groups; the tiger and cobra unit, 
emerged within the military. It was the ‘tiger unit’ that orchestrated the coup as many 
of them had fought against the initial RUF attacks. Thus, repeating the mistakes of the 
APC, the NPRC allocated the top positions and resources to this unit, and more so, 
many of them ceased to go to the war front. Instead, they tracked down and sent the 
‘cobra unit’ soldiers to the warfront and thus, these rivalries led soldiers in each group 
                                               
48 Interview (Kono, June 2007); Ero 2003 
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to ambush and kill the other49. This hierarchy undermined the war effort as prosecution 
of the war was not given the seriousness it deserved. 
 
Given this background, the protracted nature of a violent conflict in weak states might 
lead to a situation, where anarchy and chaos becomes the sine qua nom of daily 
existence. In other words, as illustrated on the conceptual model; state weakness could 
lead to a vicious cycle or further state weakening where people used violence as a 
means to survive. For instance, there was strong evidence of citizens involved in illegal 
mining activities and arms smuggling (Keen, 2005:51). The lure of economic profit led 
to a level of violent collaboration between soldiers and the RUF; called the ‘sobel’ 
phenomenon. It was a compounded word; ‘so’ for soldiers and ‘bel’ for rebels; soldiers 
by day and rebels by night, when military personnel copied the RUF’s tactics of looting 
and killing civilians50; some harassed poor farmers and took their bags of any produce 
they had harvested and blamed these attacks on the RUF. This predatory activity was 
inflicted on civilians regardless where their sympathies lay in the conflict (Ero, 
2003:239).   
What was responsible? One has to bear in mind the composition and background of the 
recruited personnel and the situation then. The NPRC had denounced the APC for 
inadequate provision of socio-economic services, corruption and gross mismanagement 
of state resources, which the NPRC promised to change. This dream was short lived as 
the regime’s key members began to amass huge fortunes of wealth, especially in the 
mineral areas51. This brought a reversal of progress against the RUF, where many 
soldiers began to sabotage the war effort with rapid succession of attacks against 
civilians. For instance, many of the soldiers neglected defending the state but joined the 
RUF in a spree of looting and diamond mining52. It was common to hear that very close 
to a military checkpoint civilians had been attacked53. Some defected to the RUF 
because of low salary, low morale, sympathy for the old regime or simply the lure of 
looting and appearing to be in control (Conteh-Morgan& Dixon -Fyle, 1999:128). 
Many of the recruits were from poor family backgrounds with the hope of making their 
                                               
49 Questionnaires, Interviews, 2007 
50 Questionnaire, Interviews, June-July, 2007; Ero, 2000:239 
51 Meredith 2005: 565; Ero 2003:239; Interviews, Questionnaires (June-July 2007) 
52 Ero 2003:239; Meredith 2005: 565;Interviews, Questionnaires (June-July 2007) 
53 Questionnaire, Interviews June-July 2007 
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own ends. One respondent said that ‘many of them were vigilantes, who were not paid, 
thus they had to kill and loot the civilians, they claimed to protect’54. 
 
The level of violence was also related to the absence of effective legal conflict 
resolution institutions. In Kono, the level of violence had to do with the old diamond 
grievances related to the absence of a system to report any unfair diamond deals. What 
happened was that often a potential buyer provided these men with the mining 
materials and food, and the norm was that he had the right to buy the diamond from 
miners whenever they found one. It happened that the one providing the necessary 
logistics of food, shelter, and tools was in the habit of taking more money as a way of 
recovering their investment. They claimed 70% and the miners 30% of every carat 
sold. Sadly, since most of the miners were uneducated men and had no idea of the 
diamond’s real value, their financiers often cheated them. The Electoral Officer in 
Kono says, “often the diamonds were devalued by the agent to make exorbitant profits 
for the buyer to pay a cheaper rate. This agent took commissions from the buyer and 
the miners”55. Thus, it happened that when the RUF attacked Kono, much of the 
violence were diamond related. Surprisingly, there were some areas protected by the 
RUF, self-styled General Mosquito and his surrogates against looting or arson because 
when Mosquito was a miner, he was treated fairly by the diamond dealers residing in 
the area56.  
The escalation of the violence among these young men was ‘an opportunity to exact 
revenge against the old order, to loot and to chase the resources unattainable during 
Steven’s reign’ (Ero, 2003: 239). Was there more to this than mere predatory and 
settling of old scores? Arguably, for any organized movement to swell, it must have a 
shared held belief among its adherents. This brings us to the issue of ideology. 
 
4.3.4 The Questions of Ideology 
What is ideology? Ideology is a concept that is used in many ways; however, it could 
be the basic shared beliefs by a group of people related to political order, which may be 
controversial, in line with mainstream or conventional wisdom. The point here is 
whether the RUF violent conflict had any ideology; political or economic. The 
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55 Interview June 2007 Kono 
56 Interview (eye witness, Kono, June 2007) 
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outbreak of violent conflicts in weak states could be seen like the tip of an iceberg; 
there is more than is actually seen. As said, given the extreme corruption, economic 
decline and inequality, which dominated the country, the tendency of political violence 
was high (Keen, 2005:36; Reno, 1995; Jackson, 2002), whose emergence  could 
provide income, authority and defence for the actors involved (Keen, 1998). The 
conflict had an economic motive, but that said it fit into an ideological context of 
political motive as well. This is where I disagree with scholars like Keen, who said, 
that the RUF had ‘some expressions of ideology’ but was not a political movement 
(Keen, 2005:36).  
There was a general genuine concern of an illegitimate political order, where for 
instance, in the capital city and provinces, political power and economic wealth was 
enjoyed by the ruling elite, their ilk and traditional rulers respectively. Thus, that was 
why when the RUF first launched its attack in the provinces; chiefs were brutally 
murdered and replaced with RUF sympathizers. Whether it was their ideology or sheer 
savagery, the RUF committed gruesome attacks on civilians to cow them into fear and 
submission to attain power. The question is if the RUF had no political motive, why did 
they fight and later joined the unpopular and unsuccessful AFRC regime in 1997? Why 
did it sign the Lomé Accord in 1999? These are some of the misconceptions that have 
been proffered for the violent conflict; that it was all about economic wealth and 
diamonds. The latter could not have been the main reason; if that was the case, the 
millions of dollars made from the illegal diamond trade would have convinced them to 
stop but they continued to fight. Even one of my ex-RUF respondents said that they 
were planning a coup at the time of Foday Sankoh’s arrest, the RUF leader, in 
Freetown. The predatory activities of both the RUF and military had one unique 
variable of youths and child combatants in the violent conflict. 
4.3.5 Youth marginalization and use of Child combatants 
One of the severe consequences of a weak state is both the psychological and physical 
destruction of its youths. After Sierra Leone’s independence in 1961, the two main 
political parties had youth wings. These politicians commonly exploited them with 
drugs in preparation to engage in the thuggery and violence of an election. Ironically, 
these manipulations foreshadowed the atrocious activities of youths that emerged in the 
violent conflict. As arguably noted, ‘war is social drama over the distribution of ideas, 
identities, resources, and social positions, which often forces the disadvantaged to 
 80
design alternative survival strategies’ (Böås, 2007:40). Was this the rationale of youth’s 
involvement in the violent conflict? Interestingly, as King said, youth was not an 
expression of age but an embrace of deprivation (King, 2007:13). In other words, most 
youths from the urban and rural poor class were circumstantial victims of their parents’ 
inability to meet their daily needs, consequent of the state’s informal economy and 
neglect. Some received no education ‘not as a matter of choice but as a consequence of 
the economic malaise’ (Böås, 2007:41).  Consequently, some decided to work in the 
harrowing diamond mines of Kono or involve in crime. Thus, their later involvement in 
the war was borne out similar need, which King noted as deprivation and aspiration to 
survive (King, 2007:13). This similar identity was like social capitals, where each 
warring faction provided the security, income and recognition they craved. 
 
International law of armed conflict defines child combatants as those under 18. Apart 
from boy soldiers, girl soldiers made up an estimated 25% of all the warring sides, and 
16% of the RUF’s total force (Mc Kay, 2005:390). The RUF abducted these girls like 
their boy counterparts; the Kamajors was not known to have used female nor girl 
soldiers, while the military only recruited female soldiers above 18. The girls within the 
RUF acted as fighters, cooks, wives, nurses for the sick, and wounded, spies and even 
as overseers in the diamond mines for their commanders or rebel husbands57. This 
same ex-RUF said that “our girls threatened to kill those of similar age if they refused 
to join us whenever we attacked a village”. One respondent also notes, “the rebel 
commanders drugged these boys to use violence in their society as a way to prevent or 
discourage desertion among its rank; it was a way of telling them they did not have to 
return to their villages where these violent crimes had been done”58. The irony was that 
these youths and child combatants became both the victims and perpetrators of 
violence.  
The RUF activities of destruction were tied to a third party of criminal network of 
states and individuals. 
4.3.6 Creation and Crystallization of War Economy 
A sign of weak states is that their ‘fragile politics, by definition, are easily permeable; 
therefore, internal issues in the 3rd world societies... get transformed into interstate 
                                               
57 Interview June 2007,ex-RUF Kailahun 
58 Interview June 2007, Kono, Mr. Gbondo, Director for Foundation for Environmental Security and 
Sustainability  
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issues quite readily’ (Ayoob, 1986:14). Indubitably, the outbreak of the violent conflict 
in S/L confirmed the permeability of weak states being drawn into interstate issues. 
Well, how did this play out? The link between the rebellion in Liberia and S/L could be 
traced back to the coup, which brought Samuel Doe to power in Liberia, 1980. The 
assassination of the ousted President, Tolbert, and his son led to a tense relationship 
between Doe and the Ivorian president. The latter, Houphouet Boigny, had an adopted 
daughter married to President Tolbert’s son, Adolphous, who at the time of the coup 
sought refuge at the French embassy. His daughter then pleaded with him to intervene 
and President Doe assured him that the son would be spared. However, he was later 
abducted and executed. This explained why the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) later used Cote D’Ivoire as an entry point to invade Liberia and start the brutal 
civil war in 1989 59 (also Meredith, 2005:557). 
 
Following the brutal events of the Liberian civil war, and the threat of regional 
insecurity, the West Africa Economic Community leaders (ECOWAS) decided to act 
decisively and resolve the civil war. The Nigerian military dictator, General Ibrahim 
Babangida, said that a rapid military intervention in Liberia was necessary (Meredith, 
2005:557). Ironically, S/L as an ECOWAS member became the base of this military 
intervention force (ECOMOG). In 1990, ECOMOG intervened in Liberia and 
prevented Taylor’s NPFL from taking control of the capital, Monrovia. In a radio 
interview, Taylor said S/L would taste the bitterness of war60. The later RUF invasion 
from Liberia to S/L was initially thought of as retaliation by the NPFL. However, it 
was a camouflaged as both the NPFL of Liberia and the RUF had been trained, 
equipped and financed from Libya61.  How and why the Libya involvement?   
Libya began its relations in S/L by the 70s and quickly made an impact. Since 60 % of 
the population is Islamic believers, Libya offered grants for the annual Muslim 
pilgrimage to Mecca (Abdullah, 1998:211). During the APC one party rule, university 
students were its most articulate opposition group, calling for radical change. Libya 
then seized the opportunity to surreptitiously court these students and financed the 
promotion of its Green Book at the Fourah Bay College campus, as Abdullah says, to 
recruit local revolutionaries who would overthrow all western backed governments in 
                                               
59 Corroborated by the interviews June 2007 in Freetown, Kono &Kenema 
60 ‘BBC Focus on Africa’ is a daily radio current affairs program aired by the BBC to Africa 
(January, 1991). 
61  Interview, Freetown, June 2007; Questionnaire; Meredith, 2005 
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West Africa(1998: 213-15). In brief, this relationship led to the training of S/L 
dissidents in Libya who started the RUF. Since the northern groups somehow 
dominated the APC (chiefly Limba and Temne), it was reasonable that the RUF was 
able to get support from the southeastern district of Kailahun closed to the Liberian 
border62. This confirmed Ayoob’s view of ‘fragile politics’ and ‘permeability of weak 
states’.  
 
When the ECOMOG forces were sent to Liberia, 1990, many of the S/L military 
personnel returned home with looted goods: vehicles, refrigerators, tapes, TV and 
video sets. These looted goods were sold at high prices, and thus, many junior 
personnel within the military began to bribe their senior officers to send them in 
Liberia (King, 2007:12); some sacrificed their annual salaries, others had to make a 
deal with their seniors to share some booties if they return. Ominously, the war against 
the RUF was seen as a way of punishing other soldiers who were insubordinate to their 
seniors, thus increasing the animosity within the rank and file. The Nigerian forces 
within the ECOMOG were accused to have looted a 50$million worth of goods in 
Liberia (Meredith, 2005:567). The port of Freetown was used, as a transit point to 
Nigeria with the massive looted cars and other valuables transported63. The services of 
the Guinean military were their surreptitious activities or double game by providing the 
RUF with fighting logistics; a trademark of mercenary64. This source claimed the RUF 
used to sell cocoa, coffee and diamonds to neighbouring Guinea in return for weapons 
and other food items, although the authority was not aware. After the RUF had 
established itself, the APC recruited United Liberation Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (ULIMO), which was a blend of Krahn and Mandingo refugee ethnic militia, 
fighting against Taylor’s NPFL (Keen, 2005:86). These ULIMO forces started looting 
civilians (CRS, 1995 Report), and they soon became notorious for lawlessness without 
any control from the government (Keen, 2005:99). 
The emergence of this rebel soldiers is linked to the ramifications of state weakness. It 
confirms the intrinsic predatory activities of warring factions in violent conflict in weak 
and failed states (Keen, 2005, Reno, 1995, Rotberg, 2004).  The point is that some 
weak states are unable to control and protect their natural resources and territories 
                                               
62 My personal interpretation; Questionnaires, Interviews June-July 2007; Conteh-Morgan &Dixon 
Fyle, 1999:128. 
63  These were events myself witnessed  
64 Interview, June 2007,Kailahun, ex-RUF 
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against illegal internal or external criminal networks. Since the state was weak, it 
created the condition for an organized group of opposition represented by the RUF and 
its foreign backers, who exploited this weakness to their advantage. Thus, foreign 
involvement became a serious problem and there was clear evidence that Liberia and 
Burkina Faso supported the RUF. The looted diamonds ‘provided it with $300 million 
dollars and the arms were procured in Eastern Europe and moved through Burkina Faso 
to Liberia for eventual delivery to the RUF ’65.  
It is important to note that it is very difficult to launch an insurgent campaign without 
external support. Concurrently, it is not easy for an insurgence to get external support 
because of some lofty ideals of democracy, human rights, and economic justice. It 
could get external support due to economic interests. The diamonds did just that, which 
explained why people like Taylor of Liberia were involved with the RUF. For instance, 
one ex- RUF combatant said when they began to suffer military setbacks; Taylor told 
them to defend their areas and made it known that they cannot return to Liberia. So the 
RUF leader said since this was the situation, retreat was never an option but to advance. 
Taylor also advised them to concentrate on the diamond rich areas66. Significantly, the 
RUF was never able to effectively occupy these diamond areas until 1997, following 
the AFRC coup, which we shall discuss later.  
 
4.4 The Boomerang Effect of State Weakness 
The conceptual model has shown that the weak state has a spiral process. First, we 
have seen how it led to a series of legitimacy crises, disputes and tensions against the 
APC government. As the state became engulfed in disputes and tensions, it led to the 
violent conflict. As the various dynamics of space and time changed in the violent 
conflict, it had a rebounding effect of intensifying the disputes and tensions, which we 
now look at.  
4.4.1 The Formation of Civil Defense Groups and Mercenary Activities 
Another effect of weak state is the failure to maintain its fragile security, which could 
give rise to the formation of rival security forces to compete with it for control over 
territory and resources. The first of these civil defence forces (CDF) was the 
Tamaboros, a traditional group of local hunters from the northern district of Kabala, 
                                               
65 S/L: The Forgotten Crisis; David Pratt; 1999:3, http: www//. global security.org        
66 Interview, Ex-RUF, Kailahun, June 2007 
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which assisted the NPRC in repelling the RUF from Kono in 199467. However, the 
Tamaboros were quickly discouraged and disarmed by the regime due to the suspicion 
that the Secretary of Defence, Lieutenant Komba Kambo, had recruited them, thus they 
feared the possibility of another coup. Later, it was obvious that the NPRC was 
incapacitated to contain the RUF; the ambush of civilian and military vehicles along 
the roads had become all too familiar and unclear. When it could not provide strong 
security everywhere, a system of selective security zones was initiated for the strategic 
towns of Kono, Makeni, Kenema, Bo and Freetown. People and NGO’s became 
increasingly frustrated by the lack of road safety from Freetown to the towns where 
humanitarian aid was needed68. In the southeast, where the attacks were common the 
people formed individual security called civil defence forces to protect their towns 
(Ero, 2003; Mauna, 1997). One of the focus groups interviewed in Bo says that they 
organized local security and divided their towns into quarters with quotas, which were 
patrolled by young men. The initial success of some CDF encouraged other traditional 
rulers to recruit more men to protect their towns and villages from both RUF and sobel 
attacks69. 
 
The emergence of these forces was linked with the security vacuum that resulted from 
the failure of consecutive governments and the security forces to protect the people 
against the RUF. The ‘involvement of the CDF led to the in formalisation of violence; 
mistrust between the military and the civilian’ (Ero, 2003:239). The Kamajor militia 
began to assume protection and security of their areas, while the NPRC made several 
attempts to bolster its security by contracting mercenaries. First, they brought the 
Gawkers from Nepal who did not stay long because their leader was killed70. Since the 
NPRC could not guarantee itself enough protection in the diamond areas and it needed 
to continue to mine whatever diamonds it could get to finance its war with the RUF. 
The RUF’s presence in these areas was something the NPRC could not afford to lose, 
thus, it hired the services of private security firms to provide security for mining 
companies, like Branch Energy, which would pay it  in cash or in kind.  
In early 1995, when the RUF was only miles from Freetown, the government was 
approached by the director of Branch Energy, based in Kono to hire the services of a 
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68 This was what the people interviewed in all these districts told me. 
69 Questionnaire; Interviews 2007; Ero 2003 
70 Questionnaires; Interviews, 2007; Meredith, 2005  
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South African security firm, Executive Outcome (E.O) to stop the RUF71. Coupled with 
its superior air power, a small military unit and the civil Kamajor militia, the E.O 
mercenaries cleared the RUF from all diamond areas within a month. The presence of 
E.O brought in other mining and security firms, linked with several British, Canadian 
and US companies.  Many of these diamond and security firms also had vital links with 
the major players in the conflict, which further obscured the tasks of these actors in 
settling the conflict (Hirsch, 2001:175). 
But the initial support enjoyed by the NPRC evaporated due to the massive corruption 
and the perceived ploy of them escalating the conflict for their own gain. 
 
4.4.2 Internal and International Demand for Change and a Return to 
Democratic Civilian Government 
As things heated up, public opinion was galvanized both against the NPRC and RUF; 
people began to agitate a return to democratic rule. The NPRC made several attempts 
to botch the process, including beating, humiliating, arresting and detaining politicians 
and civil activists alike. Nonetheless, the NPRC leader came under intense international 
pressure to return to democratic governance. In August 1995, it summoned a national 
consultative conference, which overwhelmingly agreed to hold parliamentary and 
presidential elections scheduled for February 26 1996. The regime became divided 
over holding a general election; some believed it should end the war or postponed the 
elections until peace with the RUF was pursued. Some say that there was a power 
struggle inside the NPRC and on January 16 1996; the deputy chairman overthrew the 
chairman. This coup was considered by many as an attempt to remain in power, which 
in turn heightened popular fervour for the elections. On polling day, there was a burst 
of sporadic gunfire in the city that led to a two-hour break in voting.  In the 
countryside, many voters who had voting ink on their hands or fingers were amputated. 
In Freetown, people came out in droves and show of desperation onto the streets; some 
had to chase the military personnel to vote.  Prior the polls, one of the key opposition 
leaders on a BBC interview, said that if he became president, the RUF leader would 
only become ‘an honorary paramount chief’. Interestingly, on another BBC interview, 
the RUF leader said that if this politician were elected president, there would be no 
peace.  The first round of elections produced no outright winner and with the RUF 
                                               
71 Interview, June 2007,Kono; Cornwell,Africa Security Review Vol7 No4,1998 
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leader’s interview, the other political parties decided to vote for the SLPP against 
Karefa Smart. The SLPP won and was sworn in as the first democratic elected 
government after 24 years of one party dictatorship and four years of military rule. 
 
4.4.3 Ethnicity and Class 
Ethnicity is often used by the ruling elite in weak states to shore up support (Jackson, 
2002:41). This was discussed previously (i.e. 1990:1967-89) as an apt situation in S/L 
after 1961. To recap, after the SLPP lost the 1967 general elections to the APC, it 
instigated the military to overthrow the APC. Later, though the APC was dominated by 
the northern ethnic groups, yet it revealed thus, if ethnicity is "a series of nesting 
dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness"(Cohen, 1978:373), then, in some 
ways, it could be argued that the APC’s politics was more of class rather than ethnicity, 
which incites tensions among the various ethnic groups. The point is that ethnicity was 
used to get power, elite or class was a means of control and maintaining the power. As 
I mentioned in Chapter 2, the inclusion and exclusion of class was evident where the 
President who was Limba (the 3rd largest northern ethnic group) was married to a 
Mende (the 1st largest ethnic group from the southeast); his 1st Vice President was a 
Limba and was also married to a Mende; his 2nd Vice President was a Temne (the 2nd 
largest northern ethnic group) was married to a Susu (another northern ethnic group). 
The Chief Justice happened to be a Mende as well; the Bank Governor happened to be 
a Temne and later a Krio as well (the descendants of the freed slaves). In addition, 
when it came to parliamentary representations, almost all the eighteen ethnic groups 
were represented; most of the ministerial positions were also held by members of the 
southeast (i.e. the Mendes) since they had more educated people than the other ethnic 
groups. Thus, it was understandable why the other classes became frustrated, felt 
bitterly discriminated and excluded from the socio-economic and political participation 
of the country. 
Ake defines ethnicity as institutionalizing “the divisions which exist by making ethnic 
identity the basis for political and economic participation and by striving to improve 
the competitive strength of the ethnic groups of the top leaders of the ruling faction” 
(1976:9). In weak states, ethnicity is the practical exclusion of other groups by the 
group in power, thereby eroding its legitimacy (Jackson, 2002; Ake, 1976). This was 
evident in escalating the violent conflict.  
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It is important to underscore the profile of the SLPP government and Kamajor militia. 
The SLPP was a Mende dominated government and the Kamajor militia was 
established as a local defence unit by the Mende people from the south eastern part of 
the country, who had had a tense relationship with the military. After the SLPP had 
been a month in office, the RUF initiated a cease fire and continued the peace 
negotiation began by the NPRC in Cote D’Ivoire. A peace deal was reached with the 
SLPP government but the RUF insisted that all foreign forces, including mercenaries 
be withdrawn before implementing the demobilization and disarmament process.  
Arguably, as the state weakened further ethnicity re-emerged as a kind of security and 
trust. The SLPP government was distrustful of the military; especially their 
machinations to thwart the democratic process, and it intended on neither disarming the 
Kamajor nor sending the foreign troops home. Since effective security hinged on the 
presence of E.O, the government renewed their contract for 20 months at $35.2 million 
(Shaw cross, 1999:38). Part of the contract included the right to mine the diamond 
areas, whose presence changed the balance of power in the government’s favour 
without relying on the military. One military intelligent personnel says, “as the peace 
agreement with the RUF became doubtful, the government used its Kamajor militias to 
attack their positions, which was the turning point of escalating the violence”72. The 
resumption of violence and distrust of the military forced the government’s dependence 
on the foreign forces for its security, which worsened their already fragile relationship. 
The SLPP decided to quietly stamp its authority by overhauling the military, which was 
a difficult situation as we see. 
 
Since the military had been dominated by the northern ethnic groups during the APC 
and NPRC era, the government seemingly tried to do likewise. It started when the 
attorney general said that since the military chief of staff ailed from the northern 
groups, his loyalty was a liability to his government. He then recommended that the 
mercenary group, E.O, should restructure and retrain the military, absorb the Kamajor 
militia, who were Mende dominated, in the military, and both the military and E.O 
heads should report directly to the President (Musa& Fayemi, 2000:91). This policy 
only meant to anger the military, which wanted to protect the corporate interest it had 
enjoyed under the APC and NPRC. The President exacerbated the situation when he 
                                               
72 Interview with an intelligence officer in the Sierra Leone Army, June 2007, Kailahun 
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visited the northern districts headquarter in Makeni, and told the people they owed an 
apology to the southeast because the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was from the region. 
Such a statement was meant to stir up hate in a state already at war73. 
 
Grippingly, the roots of a politicized and corrupt military had grown into a kind of 
dense forest that its actual size was unknown. The government was asked by 
international donors to reduce its expenditure on foreign troops. But they probed into 
the military’s actual size and decided to downsize the unofficial 18,000 men to 3000 in 
order to save money. The idea itself was not bad than the timing; the intent of ethnicity 
had been made known to the military. And since the domination of the military by the 
northern group was the main concern, it went ahead and retired several senior and 
junior personnel without adequate compensation (Musa& Fayemi, 2000:91). 
Simultaneously, it increased the Kamajor militia’s size to a standing force of 20,000 
men, transformed into a private and their traditional hunting rifles were replaced with 
Kalashnikovs (Musa & Fayemi, 2000:91-93). Whether the government favoured the 
Kamajors over the military remained unclear; however, one thing was clear that the 
Deputy Defense Minister happened to be their leader. One personnel says, “the 
Kamajor was formed by the southeastern Mende people”74. Their influence was a 
problem as another respondent notes, “the Kamajors began to rival the army, and 
fought against them for control of the rich diamond fields of Tongo. This led to further 
skirmishes and deaths between them; even some soldiers were imprisoned without 
trials for killing Kamajors”75. By September 2006, some officers were arrested and 
detained for an alleged coup attempt on the government and this was the backdrop for 
the next legitimacy crises and violent conflict. 
4.4.4 The AFRC Interregnum 1997-1998 
As the tensions mounted, the military was further alienated; for instance, in radio talk 
shows, people lashed at them for what they considered their distrust; such programs 
were not censored. Whether this was a cause, the accusations became evident when 
the military staged another coup on May 25 1997 calling itself the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The plotters released hundreds of prisoners from the 
                                               
73 Personal recollection. It was difficult to find local newspapers as source but some people 
interviewed in Kono and Makeni corroborated it. 
74 Interview; Kono, June 2007. He said he was a Mende as well but never supported them against the 
military. 
75 Interview focus group, June 2007 ,Kono  
 89
central prison, including the officers, who were supposed to face trial the next day for 
their alleged coup plot in September 2006. It is important to note again that the AFRC 
coup was a continuation of ethnicity, regional and class struggle. Most of the actors 
were from the northern and western parts of the country. The classes were 
exemplified by the rich and educated politicians, and the poor and half educated 
young men. These soldiers had been security to the NPRC officials. Having witnessed 
their lifestyles, they too wanted to enjoy the same privileges and corruption. Another 
military respondent says, “this coup was led by sons of some retired senior officers, 
who said that their fathers were not treated properly by the government”76. Some key 
northern based politicians, who felt aggrieved at the SLPP’s victory in the 1996 
general election, fearlessly tried to defend the junta in the media that their coup was 
justifiable. Notably, was the former ousted President; J.S Momoh, who came from 
Guinea where he had sought refuge since 1992, allegedly to negotiate a smooth 
restoration of the SLPP government. Others include Dr. Abass Bundu, who was the 
former ECOWAS Secretary General and later NPRC foreign minister, Dr. Karefa 
Smart, the opposition leader of the United National Peoples Party in parliament. Their 
status gave credence to the SLPP politicians, who saw the AFRC coup as a 
clandestine operation of their APC rivals bent on removing them from power. 
 
The AFRC alleged that the Deputy Defence Minister, also the Kamajor chief, had 
collected Le 35 billion every month for his militia; they received late salaries and 
deprived of other facilities. It accused the SLPP of destroying the peace with the RUF, 
and thus, extended the olive branch to the RUF, asking them to leave the forest and 
come to the city. But the RUF initially refused and said until they heard from their 
detained leader in Nigeria. When he later spoke with them via radio the RUF entered 
the capital like drove of bees. Unlike the NPRC coup of 1992, the AFRC received 
massive internal and international condemnation; partly, it had no justification to 
overthrow a democratic government barely a year in power. There was massive civil 
disobedience; no state institution functioned; the bitter fight with the Kamajors 
continued. Many of those who opposed or supported the ousted SLPP were killed. 
Things worsened with an economic sanction imposed by the international community, 
forcing many to flee the country; few unfortunate ones died from road accident or 
                                               
76 Interview ,military personnel ,June 2007; Kenema military headquarter 
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boats as they tried to escape. This became the turning point for the internationalization 
of the conflict as we now discuss.  
 
4.5 Internationalization of the conflict 
As illustrated in the conceptual model, the outbreak of violent conflict in a weak state 
could have a boomerang effect, i.e. it could escalate further to weaken the state with 
more legitimacy crises, disputes and tensions. This was borne out in S/L during the 
AFRC coup with an escalation of the violence by an overt international involvement. 
Now we try to examine the 2nd research question: what role can international actors 
play in escalating or solving internal violent conflicts?  Hence, the mix international 
response, the use of mercenaries to restore the government and how the international 
community helped in resolving the conflict will be considered. 
                   
                     4.5.1 The whirlpool of violent conflict in weak states 
Arguably, another consequence of weak state embroiled in violent conflict is that if it 
cannot handle its security, it often gravitates toward a threat to regional instability. 
This often forces the international community to become involved (Jackson, 2002:30). 
The AFRC coup of 1997 was one such example and its outbreak coincided with the 
last OAU summit in Zimbabwe. Significantly, since this was the last summit, it 
appealed to the international community to not recognise the junta and urged 
ECOWAS countries to assist and restore the democratic government in S/L and the 
full implementation of the Abidjan Accord (OAU CM/DEC.356). In the face of this 
diplomatic stunt, the AFRC busily tried to get internal support as it illegitimacy 
continued to worsen. It was ironic also that the ousted government was negotiating 
with the junta through the ECOWAS and planning with mercenaries to remove it. The 
ousted President in a BBC radio interview said he knew about the coup three days 
before but did nothing to stop it.  He then said the Nigerian military should bomb the 
capital and the indication was that all the civilians who were unable to seek refuge 
were junta collaborators77. Later, 300 Nigerian soldiers were arrested on June 2, 1997, 
when they attempted in vain an invasion of the city.   
 
                                               
77 This was an interview he had with the BBC in Guinea days after his government had been 
overthrown, corroborated by the questionnaires, interviews in Freetown 2007. 
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Soon after, the foreign ministers of Nigeria, Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, and Ivory Coast 
established a five-man committee, with the OAU Secretary General, to start dialogue 
with the junta and report to the ECOWAS chairman, who happened to be the pariah 
Nigerian dictator, General Sani Abacha. After the meeting in Guinea, a communiqué 
was issued, which among other things called for ‘dialogue, unrecognition of the junta, 
economic sanctions and the use of force’. However, the junta did not adhere to this 
communiqué and since the national airport was occupied by the Nigerian contingent, 
what followed was a series of sustained air attacks by their military jets on specific 
targets, including the military headquarter. The sad irony was that many civilians 
were killed during such air campaigns. 
 
These attacks increased popular opposition at the junta to negotiate than continue to 
risk people’s security and on October 3rd, 1997; the junta signed what was known as 
the Conakry Peace Plan. Though the agreement called for the cessation of hostilities; 
immunity of the junta; demobilization of all combatants by the Nigerian ECOMOG 
contingent; none was so controversial as the restoration of the ousted civilian 
government within nine months and the release of the RUF leader, who was held in 
detention by the Nigerian dictator. It was controversial because many people did not 
trust the RUF and it was uncertain that the junta was serious in their pledge peace 
agreement. The junta seemed poised to maintain power while the ousted regime was 
desperate and ready to risk all it had to return to power. Thus, it would have been 
difficult for the junta to see themselves disarmed by their Nigerian counterparts. 
 
The twist in the tail during these talks was that the AFRC’s main supporter, President 
Taylor of Liberia, tried to throw spanner in the committee’s work. It was understood 
that the AFRC junta opposed the deployment of Nigerian troops to disarm the S/L 
military on Taylor’s backdoor advice. Since Taylor’s goal was to ensure free access 
and diamond supplies, he secretly brought in mercenaries and weapons for the junta 
from Ukraine; Israel and Eastern Europe (Pratt, 1999:3). In like manner, while in 
exile, the UK’s High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, proposed the 
services of Sandline; a British mercenary security firm to the government. Sandline 
International is closely related with E.O, an intricate mining firm, which provides 
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security to weak African states in exchange for their resources78 (Musa& Fayemi 
2000:91). Sandline became involved because the government still owed E.O an 
outstanding debt of $19.5 million after terminating its contract in 1997 (Musa& 
Fayemi, 2000). The risk was there to take since there was no guarantee that the AFRC 
would repay the debt.  A deal was reached for Sandline to train and equip about 
40,000 Kamajors based in Guinea, provide arms, food and transportation for the 
20,000 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers based at the national airport (Meredith, 
2005:570). On February 18 1998, these combined forces, including two hundred 
Sandline mercenaries launched a ground and air assault on Freetown, defeating the 
AFRC-RUF alliance, whose fighters fled the advancing forces. Many of the AFRC 
soldiers left behind were caught and set alight by angry mobs. 
 
There was a significant twist in the Sandline connection. First, it had to do with Tony 
Blair’s personal side of the story that he intervened because of his childhood days in 
Freetown when his father was a professor at FBC, the University of S/L (Gberie, 
2004:3). The other had to do with the violation of UN arms embargo on S/L.  When 
Tony Blair’s new Labour government was sworn in 1997, it initiated a new ‘ethical 
foreign policy’, meaning his government would discourage the shipment of UK arms 
to rogue states. Thus, Sandline became a hot political issue in Britain, when the 
foreign minister, Robin Cook, came under attack from the press and political 
opposition that his government has knowingly violated the arms embargo.79 The 
question was also raised of how the British government would explain its ethical 
policy with its cooperation with the Nigerian military government, which was 
suspended by the Commonwealth because of its poor human rights record and 
concerns of restoring democratic rule. An investigation was opened as to whether 
Sandline violated the embargo with the approval of the Foreign Ministry. The initial 
response from the British Foreign office was an angry denial, dismissing the 
allegation ‘as irresponsible rubbish’ (Cornwell, 1998:5). However, it later became 
clear that the senior officials and diplomats knew about the mission. Sandline’s 
lawyers meticulously revealed the meetings it held with senior officials of the UK and 
US governments about their plans, which meant they enjoyed their tacit 
                                               
78 New York Times, May 13, 1998 
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approval(Cornwell,1998:5). In short, the furore continued but Tony Blair’s Labour 
government was able to survive the embarrassment.  
As previously mentioned in brief, the RUF since it started the violent conflict in 1991 
was never able to effectively occupy the diamond areas after the AFRC coup of 1997. 
The effective occupation of the diamond areas intensified the illegal mining of 
diamonds and the involvement of international criminal networks in what became 
known as ‘blood diamonds’.   
 
4.5.2 International Criminal Networks or Blood Diamonds Cartel 
As S/L glaringly depicted it could not protect its resources and territories, the 
availability of getting cheap diamond turned it into a bazaar of limitless opportunities 
of wealth during the war (Meredith, 2005). Thus, it was not only the attraction of 
diamonds than the demographics and space the country offered for corrupt, 
clandestine business operated by criminal networks.  The Lebanese business class has 
served as link and finance of Islamic extremists operating in Lebanon and the Middle 
East. The first to come were Hezbollah agents in 1986, when Yasser Arafat arrived 
and negotiated to have a PLO training base80. This Lebanese community provided 
most of Hezbollah operatives with travelling documents and finance. In a later UN 
report, there was link between Al-Qaeda and the RUF, with Taylor providing the 
connection, exchanged money and weapons for diamonds. During the AFRC’s nine 
months reign, one Lebanese diamond dealer, Ossaily, was introduced to the junta by 
his Freetown counterpart to supply them with four containers of combats and weapons 
in exchange for diamonds, which were channelled via Liberia (Gberie, 2002). It was 
reported that billions of dollars worth of diamonds were imported into Belgium from 
Liberia, even when it produced limited amount and of less quality (Gberie, 2002). 
 
After the Lomé Peace Accord between the government and the RUF, the UN Security 
Council appointed a Panel of Experts, which produced its report in December, 2000, 
blaming the Liberian warlord, President Taylor, as the RUF’s lifeline, with a looting 
motive than politics. The report estimated that the diamond trade was worth between 
$25 million and $125 million a year (UN Report 2000:19). It was reported that Al-
Qaeda operatives visited RUF-held diamond areas many times and arranged diamonds 
                                               
80 My personal recollection; Farah, 2004:44-55 
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worth million of dollars81. The then interim RUF leader, General Issa Sesay, was said 
to have flown to Abidjan in late 2001 with 8, 000 carats of diamonds, which he sold 
to two dealers of undisclosed identity. The dealers used a Lebanese merchant who ran 
their deals between Abidjan and the Liberian capital, Monrovia (UN Security Council 
Resolution, 2002). In 1999, the UN Security Council imposed ban on S/L and Liberia 
exportation of diamonds until a UN monitored certificate system was in introduced in 
September 2000. Without doubt, the great profit of this illegal diamond trade made 
the RUF and its supporters desperate to exploit the resources; thus, they stopped at 
nothing. For instance, in Kono the AFRC/RUF brought tractors and bulldozers from 
Liberia to mine. I saw evidence in Tongo and Kono where the AFRC/RUF nearly 
destroyed every infrastructure and subject it captive miners to incomprehensible 
savagery; some were killed for admitting they were tired. Under such brutality these 
people produced hundreds of millions dollars worth of diamonds. The predatory 
activities of these insurgents was not typical to S/L; it exists in state where the 
authority uses a calculated strategy of weakening the army (like the Zairean military 
under the former dictator of President Mobotu), the reduction in military expenditure 
or scarcity in logistics compel soldiers to engage in such criminal behaviour, e.g. 
Angola (see Kaldor, 1999:92-93). One respondent in Kono says it became worse 
when the local youths joined forces with the RUF to engage in criminal activities; 
even the Nigerian ECOMOG contingent deployed there, combined with these youths 
providing them security while they mined and later shared whatever diamond was 
found. I saw most houses that had been dug from the inside; some of which had 
fallen, roads and even the major streets; in and out of the town, were dug for 
diamonds during the RUF/AFRC occupation of the town in 1997-2001.  
 
4.5. 3 Ending the violent conflict 1998-2002 
The SLPP government was restored on March 10, 1998 and declared the entire 
military banned; except the few personnel who had fought with the invading 
mercenaries. The AFRC-RUF alliance fled to their base near the Liberian border. 
General Abacha, the Nigerian dictator, who was the strongest ally had warned the 
SLPP to negotiate with the rebel army. In its press briefings, the government’s 
Information minister had nothing like dialogue in its political vocabulary. In other 
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words, they were hawkish and had no substitute for victory. It was the start of a 
beleaguered state as the conflict reached a new climax. It was a significant moment 
where the AFRC key members, including the former ousted APC President, J.S 
Momoh was arrested.  Later, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was sent back in July 
2008 from Nigerian to Freetown and was put on trial together with the captured 
AFRC members. After the trial, the RUF leader and twenty-four of the AFRC 
members, including the former APC President, J.S Momoh, were sentenced to death. 
As some within the SLPP would have wanted, the former APC President, executed 
their own kin, Francis Minah, who was the 1st VP to Momoh, for what they thought 
was an alleged failed coup attempt, he was never part of. Thus, it was payback time 
for Momoh but the nation became divided between the SLPP government as the 
former President and condemned AFRC junta accused still had supporters; the RUF 
warned it would intensify its attacks unless their leader was released. President Taylor 
said it would be ‘foolish and disastrous’ to execute them82, and with the junta’s nine 
months experience still fresh in people’s mind, a strong public opinion convinced the 
government to execute the accused on October 30 1998, while the RUF leader waited 
on death row83. 
 
The AFRC did not continue its alliance with the RUF after their defeat from 
Freetown. One respondent says from what he saw in his district of Makeni, the people 
responsible for the amputations were the AFRC soldiers, which brought a division 
within the AFRC/RUF rank and file. He says the “RUF for its part saw that the AFRC 
had gone beyond its limit by indiscriminately harassing, looting, raping, amputating 
and killing the civilians whose support they needed; they started to write on the 
tarmac: ‘no raping, looting or harassing of civilians”84. But the AFRC did not heed the 
warning, thus, the RUF mobilised against them since they were numerically stronger 
and removed the AFRC soldiers from Makeni, as well as chasing them out of all the 
major towns in the northern district. According to him, since these soldiers were 
afraid of being killed by the RUF, some decided to surrender to the other government 
troops based in Kabala, while the others decided to storm Freetown.85 The AFRC 
advanced from their northern stronghold in Kabala and went rampaging in the 
                                               
82 BBC Radio broadcast ‘Talk about Africa’, October, 1998 
83 Interviews, 2007; Meredith 2005:571 
84 A. Conteh, Teacher, Interviews, Makeni July 2007.  
85 Eye Witness, Augustine Conteh, Teacher, Interview, July 2007, Makeni.  
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countryside; raping, killing, amputating people’s hands and limbs. This time the rebel 
army re-supplied with arms captured from the Nigerian forces, occupied ¾ of the state 
and advanced to the capital. In its propaganda, the government played down the issue 
and assured the people of imminent victory86. Those who agitated for negotiation with 
the rebels were called collaborators, which often meant death or incarceration.  
 
In Kono, one respondent says that the Nigerian contingent was lured into diamond 
mining and caught off guard, by providing security for the local youths to mine for 
them. The heavy stockpile of military hardware left behind by the fleeing troops was 
captured by the AFRC soldiers87. On January 6, 1999, the rebel army stormed 
Freetown and killed an estimated 5000 people; raped hundreds of women; burnt down 
half the city’s eastern center, abducted hundreds of boys and girls and amputated tens 
of people88. These amputations were not a form of punishment like the Islamic 
judicial system than to spread fear and wade off resistance. It was significant that 
these destructions and amputations were done on the city’s eastern part because 
during the military defeat of the junta, most of the captured army personnel were 
burnt alive there and thus, these were acts of revenge89, and in the western part of the 
city few, if any, houses were burnt or people killed. The remaining Nigerian force 
ably defended the western half of the city until reinforcement arrived, which fought 
back and pushed the AFRC rebel soldiers beyond the city until pressure was mounted 
on both sides to a ceasefire. 
 
After this 2nd Freetown debacle the government agreed to a ceasefire but why? To 
start with, there was a popular reaction against the government’s position of not 
negotiating with the RUF; people said it had no choice but to negotiate. The SLPP’s 
strongest ally, Nigerian dictator, General Abacha, had surreptitiously died in his 
presidential palace and the new leader said he was not going to stay the course 
indefinitely in S/L. It was reported the war cost $1 million a day and he promised to 
withdraw its 10,000 troops out the ECOMOG intervention force by May 199990. 
                                               
86 This was something myself witnessed when the government radio broadcast comedy spoke about the  
attacks and said it was a rumour. Even one journalist who reported about the advancing army/ rebel 
forces on the capital was reportedly killed. 
87 Questionnaires, Interviews, 2007 
88 Questionnaires, Interviews 2007, Meredith, p571. 
89 Interviews, Freetown, June 2007 
90 http:// www.africa.upenn.edu/newsletters/irin420.html 
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Thus, Nigeria had seen enough and together with the British foreign minister, Robin 
Cook, told President Kabba that the war was unwinnable and that a diplomatic 
solution, however, bitter was the option or he should look elsewhere for troops if his 
government was to survive91.  
Also the international community came under intense attack; some with vitriolic 
comments for its tacit racism, others saw it as double standards when NATO 
intervened in Kosovo, 1999 against the Serb forces of President Slobodan Milosevic 
to stop what was considered then as ethnic cleansing. The USA told the government it 
must hold peace talks with the RUF and President Clinton sent Rev Jesse Jackson to 
negotiate a peace deal. However, Mr Jackson made a controversial statement to liken 
the RUF to the ANC under Apartheid in South Africa and when he came under 
criticism he apologized. It thus showed that he did not understand the violent 
conflict’s history.  
 
Another significant twist had to do with the rivalry between France and Britain. 
Although there was no hard confirmation, it was understood that France had been 
secretly assisting the RUF. The RUF often spoke via Radio France International and 
since the RUF invasion in 1991; there was a lull between S/L and France as the latter 
closed its diplomatic activities in S/L. Thus, the UK and French foreign ministers, 
Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine, embarked on what was seen as a new Anglo-French 
diplomatic drive to discuss their common stronger interests and cooperation in 
Africa92. 
 
During this diplomatic stunt, a key jigsaw puzzle was about to fall in place. After the 
AFRC soldiers had been routed from Freetown, they took with them hundreds of 
abductees, including the Catholic Archbishop of S/L, Bishop Ganda with them to their 
hideout beyond the city. As Utas said, this 2nd AFRC exodus, the 1st being in February 
1998, saw the outgrowth of another splinter group, the West Side Boys (Jorgel&Utas, 
2008:10). This West Side Boys (WSB) occupied the strategic entry and exit point 
from the city, Okra Hill, from where they ambushed and loot vehicles plying the route 
to and fro the city. What became significant of the WSB was that after the 1st military 
defeat of the AFRC in 1998, most of its top leadership, including the chairman, Major 
                                               
91 The Independent Newspaper, London, March 10,1999 
92 ibid 
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J.P Koroma, escaped with the RUF to their Kailahun base. But together with his wife, 
the AFRC chairman was arrested, detained and tortured by the RUF commander, self-
style General, Mosquito. Most people did not know about this incident until the WSB 
demanded they would only accept the government’s ceasefire if their leader was 
released. A diplomatic marathon started to find out whether the allegation was correct. 
It was correct and as it turned out, President Taylor was the key in helping the 
government to secure his release in October, 1999, where he was flown to Liberia 
before airlifted to Freetown. Thus, the WSB became instrumental in pushing the 
Lome Peace Accord. 
 
When the dust settled, both the AFRC and the RUF agreed to lay down its arms in 
exchange for amnesty, inclusion in a new coalition government. The ex-AFRC leader 
was made Chairman of a Peace Commission and the RUF leader became the Minister 
of Mines; ironically legalizing his control over the country’s diamonds he had fought 
over and killed for. The agreement was painful to the government, while the UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan himself said, “no one can feel happy about a peace 
obtained on such terms”. This was what the US and the UK wanted and the 
government being weak had no alternative but to accept. However, the Lomé Accord 
soon ran into trouble. The country was divided between areas under Nigerian and few 
SLA personnel and AFRC-RUF control. The government held territory was minimal 
while the AFRC-RUF held control of the Kono diamond territory, providing it with 
the resources to fight on.  The UN then deployed one of its largest peace keeping 
forces; 18,000 to date (Meredith: 572) to replace the Nigerian ECOMOG forces. 
However, as it happened in Rwanda, the UN force was deployed with inadequate 
resources and equipment93; the plans to disarm the RUF and Kamajor militia made 
little impact. In May 2000, UNAMSIL (UN Armed Mission in Sierra Leone) made 
known its intention to move into the diamond fields and since the RUF was not 
willing to cede control of these areas, it retaliated by capturing 500 Kenyan and 
Zambian peacekeepers94. The RUF made another advance to the city. To prevent the 
city from being overrun, the former AFRC junta leader, Major J.P Koroma, then 
Chairman of the Peace Commission, rallied people to the national stadium and told 
his ex-AFRC and the government soldiers to resist the RUF. The government officials 
                                               
93 Meredith, 2005 
94 Interviews, newspaper; Meredith 2005: 571; Questionnaire 
 99
had fled the city’s mainland to the national airport occupied by the Nigerian and UN 
forces. The British navy intervened few days later with fully armed expeditionary 
force of paratroopers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Meredith, 
2005:571).Their intervention brought calm and reverse the RUF advance and changed 
the conflict in favour of the government. Following this deal, the RUF fragmented 
into rival groups. General Mosquito based in Kailahun; belonging to the Mende ethnic 
group dominant in the RUF, was furious with Foday Sankoh for accepting the peace 
agreement and disarmament. One ex-RUF says, “he told Sankoh to piss off; asked for 
few loyal men to follow him to Liberia so that he would continue the war. The rival 
General, Issa Sesay, based in Makeni; belonging to the same Temne ethnic group of 
Sankoh, told Mosquito via radio that if he defied Sankoh he would go to Kailahun, 
disarm and kill him together with his family”95. Mosquito then fled to Liberia where 
he was later killed by President Taylor to escape a possible UN indictment of war 
crimes.   
 
Things moved quickly. On May 14, 2000, civil society groups and some members of 
parliament staged a mass demonstration of over 40,000 people to the RUF leader’s 
residence demanding the release of the abducted UN peacekeepers. Sadly, when the 
crowd arrived at his residence, the RUF security opened fire and killed about 
seventeen and injured tens of people. The RUF leader had an initial lucky escape but 
was later captured, imprisoned and charged for war crimes to be tried in a backed UN 
Special Court. But all was not yet done; there was the constant menace of the WSB 
along the highway and the government was not strong to disarm them until another 
new twist occurred. On August 25 2000, several British and one SLA personnel 
‘mysteriously left the Freetown highway, moved to the WSB camp where they were 
captured’ (Jørgel&Utas, 2008:24). It became world news as well as worrying to 
Blair’s Labour government, who daily had to answer questions about the fate of these 
hostage soldiers. It resulted in weeks of failed negotiations until the British military 
sent in a rescue mission for the soldiers. The eventual defeat of one of the most 
notorious and feared warring groups sent a clear sign to the others that demobilization 
and disarmament was a better option. In November 2000, another cease-fire was 
signed enabling the UN forces to deploy throughout the country. With the arrest of 
                                               
95 Interview, ex-RUF, Kailahun, June 2007) 
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Foday Sankoh, the new RUF leader, self-styled General, Issa Sesay, was instrumental 
in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, including the Kamajors 
militia. In January 2002, the President formally declared the violent conflict over96. 
To conclude, it showed that weak states do not possess the institutions to resolve 
conflicts. The violence escalated even more and the general growing international 
awareness provoked an intervention by the international community to coerce the 
warring sides to the negotiating table. This is a pattern in some of these conflicts; 
there is plenty of evidence to say what is required in some cases, is the committed 
response of the international community to transform them. This to some extent 
answers the 2nd research question; what role can international actors play in escalating 
or solving internal violent conflict?  
                                               
96 Questionnaires; Interviews, 2007; Meredith 2005:572. 
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5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it could be said that I attempted to apply the theory of weak states in 
the violent conflicts, namely in S/L, thus, analysing the dangers posed by weak states 
to both their internal and external security .I set out to analyse my data with the 
method of process tracing, which could involve triangulation or a diagram. I then 
came up with this diagram as a conceptual model of weak state and violent conflict 
analysis. From the data collected and the analysis in chapter 4, this conceptual model 
was confirmed that there was a relationship between the weak state of S/L and the 
violent conflict, as I once again summarized.      
Weak State/Basic Needs Violent Conflict
Legitimacy  Crises Disputes/Tensions 
 
The state’s weakness of S/L was the legacy of colonization and post decolonization. 
The weak state brought about economic decline, pervasive political corruption that 
spawned mass discontent and insecurity. This undermined the implementation of 
effective public policy and reduced people’s trust in the state’s ability to secure their 
interests and livelihoods. Legitimacy crises of the government were many as the 
government limped and struggled to regain its legitimacy by instituting a multi party 
constitution. There was an ineffective operation of state institutions to cope with the 
rapid inflation and the irregular payment of government workers for months. 
The inevitable reality was the start of a brutal conflict by the RUF and a pendulum of 
controls by the military and civilian government from 1992-2001. There was a 
genuine concern against the illegitimate political order; chiefs in the rural areas and 
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the elite in Freetown were in control of power and the economic resources, but as the 
war went on, there was an economic motive. It showed a weak state and the 
emergence of the violent conflict led to a changing dynamics across family and ethnic 
lines and created an unholy alliance of criminal network. To say the least, the state 
was bedeviled by various groups: loyal and rebel soldiers with disaffected youths, the 
intervention of states and individuals whose aim was to exploit the diamond 
resources. It showed a state that was unable to protect itself against the outbreak of 
large scale direct violence. The state’s inability to provide its own security led to 
depend on foreign mercenaries for security. As this breakdown of the cohesive 
national security continued, local social units and ethnicity re-emerged as a kind of 
security and trust that challenged the state. 
It also revealed the legitimization of violence as a likely way to resolve these conflicts 
or a likely means to have access to the economic resources. The level of escalation 
confirmed the state’s failure to resolve conflict. The outside intervention and 
committed response of the international community, including ECOMOG, UNAMSIL 
and the British army was very important in coercing the warring factions to a 
negotiating table.  
Going back to the conceptualization of state variations, given the data analysis, one 
could say that S/L during the violent conflict swung between a weak and failed state. 
It was never a collapsed state because all the various governments from 1991-2002 
were able to maintain law and order in some parts of the country; they had relative 
internal support and their international sovereignty was never questioned. 
 
5.2 Findings 
From my fieldwork, all the respondents, including interviewees and questionnaires 
suggest that good governance, meaning the adequate provision of their basic needs 




This questionnaire is intended to examine the relationship between weak states and violent conflicts. I would 
appreciate your kind and genuine opinion to help me solicit sound views. 
 
                                                    




B.  STATE CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE  
1. Do you feel that S/L was and is going through political and socio-economic problems since 1991? Yes ….. 
No….. 

















































8. Do you consider S/L a weak or strong state? Tick the appropriate box: 

























D. VIOLENT CONFLICT 
 
























E. STATE SECURITY 
 







17. Were the security forces effective in protecting the populace during the conflict? 










18. Is the Judicial process fair and accessible to the people? Yes ….No…… 












19. Do you think that these socio-economic and political problems would be solved? Yes…No…. 










20. Is the present democratic process effective in S/L? Yes….. No…. 
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